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Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution
Daniel A. Farber*
[T]he law is administered by able and experienced men, who know
too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism .... I
Almost all constitutional law courses begin with Marbury
v. Madison.2 Thus, the first topic on the agenda is the legiti-
macy of judicial review. A casual reader of law reviews might
well conclude that today this is not just the first but the only
issue on the agenda of constitutional scholars. The dominant
approach to constitutional law is to attempt to construct a the-
ory of judicial review.3 Such a theory, if successful, would pro-
vide constitutional law with a firm theoretical foundation that
would justify judicial review and dictate its parameters. 4 The
attempt to create a theory of judicial review is so prevalent to-
day that it is sometimes difficult to imagine an alternative anal-
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting
Professor, Stanford Law School. An earlier version of Part I of this Article
was presented as the inaugural lecture for the Fletcher Chair on November 6,
1987. I would like to thank Dan Conkle, Bill Eskridge, Dianne Farber, Phil
Frickey, Tom Grey, Richard Posner, and Suzanna Sherry for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 36 (1881).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). Many leading constitutional law
casebooks place Marbury near the beginning. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 2 (11th ed. 1985); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S.
SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1 (6th ed. 1986); R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 1 (1981).
3. Many such theories exist. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
105-83 (1980) (representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review); M. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91-145 (1982) (noninter-
pretive review in human rights cases); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972) (legal realism); Sandalow, Judicial Protec-
tion of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1183-95 (1977) (process-based theory
of judicial review); Wellington, History and Morals in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REv. 326, 326-27 (1983) (reviewing M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)). An ex-
cellent critique of this trend toward grand theory can be found in Kaufman,
Judges or Scholars: To Whom Shall We Look for Our Constitutional Law?, 37
J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 185-91, 193-202 (1987).
4. For an unusually explicit call for such a theory, see Ackerman, Be-
yond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 743-46 (1985) (calling for the
fashioning of a "legally cogent set of higher-law principles").
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ysis of constitutional law.5
Yet this approach to conslitutional law is not, and could
not be, the approach of the judges who actually decide constitu-
tional cases. If judges needed a sound theoretical foundation
before proceeding, Marbury v. Madison would still be on the
Supreme Court docket, having been reargued at the beginning
of each Term but never actually decided. Presumably the rest
of the Court's constitutional docket of the last century would
be on the weekly conference list, with the notation "held pend-
ing decision in Marbury v. Madison." In reality, of course, the
Court's need to decide actual cases has prevailed over any de-
sire for theoretical justification.
The thrust of this Article is that the Supreme Court is
right on this score, and the scholars are wrong. Constitutional
law needs no grand theoretical foundation. None is likely ever
to be forthcoming, and none is desirable. Instead, legal pragma-
tism is a sufficient basis for constitutional law. Legal pragma-
tism-which essentially means solving legal problems using
every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition,
legal text, and social policy-renounces the entire project of
providing a theoretical foundation for constitutional law.
Part I of this Article first attacks the foundationalist pro-
ject. It argues that the project is unlikely to succeed and that
success actually would not provide the kinds of benefits founda-
tionalists hope for.6 Part I then explains the pragmatist alter-
native and attempts to rebut the common objections to legal
pragmatism: that it is unprincipled, that it disregards prece-
dent, that it is too ad hoc, and that it denigrates legal rights.
These objections stem from a misunderstanding of the nature
of pragmatism and, in particular, from a confusion between
pragmatism and utilitarianism.7
Part II tries to demonstrate the viability of the pragmatist
alternative using the example of Roe v. Wade.8 Whereas the
foundationalist project might be summarized as "justify judicial
5. An excellent recent summary of the current debate about constitu-
tional theory can be found in Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institutional
View of Making and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 191 (1987).
On the increasing prevalence of grand theory and the rejection of common
sense and legal tradition by contemporary scholars, see Kronman, Living in
the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 873-76 (1987).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 33-48.
7. This confusion is encouraged by the common usage of pragmatic to
mean practical as opposed to principled.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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review, show that Lochner is illegitimate, and then apply the
theory to Roe,"9 a pragmatic analysis of the same set of
problems takes a different route. The pragmatic analysis be-
gins by considering whether the Court should have the power
to protect fundamental rights not named in the Constitution it-
self. The pragmatic justification for the fundamental rights doc-
trine10 is based on a blend of the text of the Constitution,
Supreme Court precedent, some evidence of original intent, and
a balanced assessment of the doctrine's societal benefits.1
As Part II explains, the obvious problem is determining
what rights are fundamental in the constitutional sense. Loch-
ner's protection for economic liberty does not withstand prag-
matic analysis, because giving serious judicial scrutiny to all
economic legislation would severely disrupt existing American
institutions and cause an extraordinary expansion of the role of
the judiciary.'2 Roe, however, dealt with a far narrower right:
the right of individuals to control their procreation. The Court
in Roe was on solid ground in finding this right to be
fundamental.
What makes Roe a hard case is not the question whether a
fundamental right is involved. Rather, the tough question-the
issue that has made the abortion debate so "bitter and divi-
sive" 1 3-is whether the state's compelling interest in preserving
human life is sufficiently implicated to justify banning abor-
tion.14 Having found the presence of a fundamental right, the
Court had no alternative but to assess the strength of the state
interest. Without considering the details of the balance the
Court struck, this Article concludes, with some misgivings, that
the Court was correct in holding that the Constitution protects
the right of a woman to have an abortion under some circum-
9. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court struck down a
statute limiting bakers to a 60-hour work week. Id. at 46, 64. In Roe, it held
existing abortion laws unconstitutional and created a three-trimester scheme
governing abortion regulation. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
10. References to fundamental rights in this Article do not include rights
that the Constitution explicitly provides such as free speech.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 49-92.
12. Much of modern constitutional theory attempts to refute Lochnef.
Pragmatism attempts to accomplish this primarily by showing that Lochner
could achieve its goals only at an unacceptable cost to other social norms. See
infra text accompanying notes 123-70.
13. K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 10 (1984).
14. This point was made early in the debate about Roe in Heyman &
Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 765, 775 (1973). Unfortunately, that article had little impact on subse-
quent writers.
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stances. At least, the Court's conclusion was sufficiently rea-
sonable that it should not be overruled.15
I. PRAGMATISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Foundationalism has been the prevailing style of recent
constitutional scholarship. Scholars have proposed various the-
ories of judicial review in the effort to discover a unified princi-
ple that would provide the basis for judicial decisions. In this
section, I argue that such a foundation probably does not ex-
ist.16 I do not regard this a great loss, however, because I doubt
that constitutional law needs such a foundation.
A growing number of scholars share my discontent with
foundationalism. An impressive array of recent legal commen-
tary has suggested a movement away from grand theory toward
something new,17 variously called "intuitionism,' 8 "pragma-
15. See infra text accompanying notes 213-22. Because Roe is on the
books, this is a more pressing question than whether it was correctly decided
in the first place.
16. This section builds on portions of an earlier work, Farber & Frickey,
Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1639-56
(1987).
17. See G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW: PRI-
VATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM XV (1985); C. STONE,
EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987); Bennett,
Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 495-96 (1984); Es-
kridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1497-1538
(1987); Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1779-
99 (1987); Gutmann, The Rule of Rights or the Right to Rule?, in NOMOS
XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 165, 166-75 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986);
Komesar, supra note 5, at 216-19; Kronman, supra note 5, at 848-61; Kronman,
Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1567-73 (1985)
[hereinafter Kronman, Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence]; Lyons, Justifzcation
and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 178, 178-79, 183-87 (1984);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword Traces of Sef-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-36 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-
Government]; Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Con-
tradictory World, in NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 71 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1986); Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 445, 462-63 (1987); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-613 (1986); Shiffrin, Liber-
alism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1192-1215
(1983); Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 385-401
(1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 68-87 (1985); Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller,
70 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1092-94 (1986); Wellman, Political Reasoning and Judi-
cial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 87-115
(1985); West, Liberalism Rediscovered." A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal
Vision, 46 U. PiTT. L. REV. 673, 726-38 (1985); Alexander, Interpreting Legal
Constructivism (Book Review), 71 CORNELL L. REV. 249, 249-51 (1985) (review-
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tism,"' 9 "prudence, '20 "institutionalism,"21 or "practical rea-
son."22 The difference among the views of these various
scholars is mostly a matter of emphasis. For present purposes
what they have in common is more important, particularly
their rejection of foundationalism and their emphasis on con-
text, judgment, and community.23
The recent attacks on legal foundationalism are part of a
broader intellectual movement. Many philosophers of science,
for example, now reject the notion of a unitary scientific
method in favor of nonfoundationalist views of the scientific
enterprise.24 In philosophy as well, foundationalist approaches
ing B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984)); T. Grey, Holmes
and Legal Pragmatism (July, 1987) (unpublished manuscript available at Min-
nesota Law Review). Some of these works are critically analyzed in Tushnet,
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1531-
44 (1985).
For related work in the broader stream of philosophy, in addition to the
works cited in previous notes, see, for example, 3 H. PUTNAM, REALISM AND
REASON: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 199-204, 287-303 (1983); R. RORTY, CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); B.
WILLIAMS, ETHIcs AND THE LIMTS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).
This group of scholars is highly diverse, and an intellectual history might
well focus on some of the sharp divisions among them. For present purposes,
however, their common traits are more significant.
18. See Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 1201; Alexander, supra note 17, at 251.
19. Sagoff, Book Review, 92 YALE L.J. 1065, 1080-81 (1984).
20. See Kronman, Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 17, at 1569.
21. Komesar, supra note 5, at 216-19.
22. See Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 17, at 22-26;
Wellman, supra note 17, at 87.
23. As Frank lichelman put it:
Situated practical judgment seems always to involve a combination of
something general with something specific, endorsement of both a
general standard and a specific application, or of both a general value
and a specific means to its effectuation. Judgment mediates between
the general standard and the specific case. In order to apply the stan-
dard in the particular context before us, we must interpret the stan-
dard. Every interpretation is a reconstruction of our sense of the
standard's meaning and rightness. This process, in which the meaning
of the rule emerges, develops, and changes in the course of applying it
to cases is one that every common law practitioner will immediately
recognize.
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 17, at 28-29; see also
Kronman, Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 17, at 1605-06 (discuss-
ing prudentialism of common law lawyers).
24. In one of the most influential books of the past thirty years, Thomas
Kuhn argued that a complex undertaking such as modern physics cannot be
reduced to a simple set of rules. Instead, modern physics relies on a whole col-
lection of shared values, assumptions, and techniques. T. KUHN, THE STRUC-
TURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONS (1962); see also Luban, Legal Modernism, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1656, 1691 (1986) (lack of mechanical determinacy acceptable in
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have come under increasing attack. Robert Nozick has ex-
plained the growing concern about the viability of foundational-
ist philosophical analysis:
Philosophers often seek to deduce their total view from a few basic
principles, showing how all follows from their intuitively based axi-
oms. The rest of the philosophy then strikes readers as depending
upon these principles. One brick is piled upon another to produce a
tall philosophical tower, one brick wide. When the bottom brick
crumbles or is removed, all topples, burying even those insights that
were independent of the starting point.25
As philosophers increasingly have realized, an interlocking web
of belief, in which each belief is supported by many others
rather than by a single foundational "brick," is inherently far
sturdier than a tower.26 Like nonfoundational legal scholars,
applying legal principles). In other words physics is as much a way of life as a
body of rules. Kuhn spoke of the ongoing everyday work of the scientist as
"normal science"; occasionally this process breaks down until a new paradigm
can be devised. T. KUHN, supra, at 24-25.
Kuhn's "paradigms" have become part of the common intellectual vocabu-
lary, but the term is almost always used to mean something like "World-view."
Kuhn had a more specific meaning in mind. For him a paradigm was not so
much a set of assumptions or a perspective as an actual example of scientific
work that served as a model for future researchers. T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL
TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 292-319
(1977) [hereinafter T. KUHN, ESSENTIAL TENSION]. Thus, Newton not only cre-
ated specific theories, but his own work became the very model of what it was
to be a physicist. Similarly, the discovery of Uranus became a paradigm for
work in astronomy. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS 114-15 (1962). As Kuhn explained such models transmit the scientific
tradition:
Scientists work from models acquired through education and through
subsequent exposure to the literature often without quite knowing or
needing to know what characteristics have given these models the sta-
tus of community paradigms. And because they do so, they need no
full set of rules. The coherence displayed by the research tradition in
which they participate may not imply even the existence of an under-
lying body of rules and assumptions that additional historical or philo-
sophical investigation might uncover.... Paradigms may be prior to,
more binding, and more complete -han any set of rules for research
that could be unequivocally abstracted from them.
Id. at 46.
Kuhn noted the importance of problem solving exercises in the education
of scientists. See T. KUHN, ESSENTIAL TENSION, supra, at 350-51. Kuhn also
stressed the role of shared scientific values, which shape but "do not deter-
mine choice." Id. at 331.
25. R. NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 3 (1981).
26. Even if we are satisfied that, in Nozick's analogy, the bottom brick
suggested by a commentator is an important insight, we may not be committed
to accepting the additional bricks on top of it. "[Tihe fact that deduction ne-
cessitates its conclusions gives rise to an important objection to the deductive
thesis-namely, that deduction cannot accommodate the distinction between
the applicability of a rule and its warranted application." Welman, supra note
1336 [Vol. 72:1331
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nonfoundational philosophers have come to realize that reason
can encompass more than deductive logic.27
In this Article, I use the term legal pragmatism for the
nonfoundational approach to law. This term highlights the con-
nection between the new turn in legal thought and the Ameri-
can pragmatist philosophers. Although, as we shall see, the
pragmatists were not opponents of such virtues as community,
tradition, or seasoned judgment,28 they emphasized the active
role of intelligence in solving social problems.29 Thus, pragma-
tism evokes, better than some of the other terms,3 0 the blend of
intelligent creativity and the conservative virtues that charac-
17, at 107; see also id. at 69-74 (discussing deductive validity). When a concrete
application of grand theory cannot be squared with our complex, situationally
sensitive web of beliefs, the former is most likely to give way. As Don Herzog
explained:
Suppose for a moment that someone succeeds, where so many have
failed, in discovering the foundations of political theory. He arrives at
some remote premises that we all concede are undeniable. Then he
triumphantly unfolds the implications contained in the junction of the
premises and the true minor premises he adds .... The outcome he
counts on, of course, is agreement, the end of doubt-the best sign
that he has developed a stunning justification. But contrast our polit-
ical commitments to our commitment to his foundations. The polit-
ical commitments are staunch, even fervent, carefully considered in
vivid and concrete contexts; the foundational commitment is new, ten-
tative, probably fuzzy because the foundations are so abstract. If it
turns out they are incompatible, which are we more likely to
abandon?
D. HERZOG, WrrHoUT FOUNDATIONS 222-23 (1985); see also J. FISHmN, BEYOND
SuBJEerivE MORAL=TY 118 (1984) ("[T]he basis for any given [rationalist deci-
sional] procedure is not so strong that we must cling to it regardless of any of
its implications for particular cases.") (emphasis in original).
27. The "web of belief," as opposed to the "tower," is an especially appro-
priate model of legal decision making. In law a supportable answer may some-
times descend from deductive analysis alone. More often such an answer will
ascend from a combination of arguments, none of which standing alone would
constitute a sufficient justification. Such "supporting arguments" are "rather
like the legs of a chair and unlike the links of a chain." &. SUMMERs, INsTRU-
mENTAIASM AND AmERcAN LEGAL THEORY 156 (1982). The judge's search,
then, is for contextual justification for the best legal answer among the poten-
tial alternatives. See Stick, supra note 17, at 349-51.
28. John Dewey, for example, emphasized all of these in his writings. See
J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 57, 105, 111, 154, 159-61, 213-15
(1927).
29. For the reader who is unfamiliar with pragmatism, the essays by
Bernstein and Rorty in POsT-ANALYTIC PHILOsOPHY 3, 48 (J. Rajchman & C.
West eds. 1985), provide a good introduction. A more extensive contemporary
argument for pragmatism can be found in R. RORTY, supra note 17.
30. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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terizes our great judges.3 L As the example of Justice Brandeis
demonstrates,3 2 the pragmatist judge can seek to foster social
progress while still honoring the existing legal tradition.
I begin the case for legal pragmatism with a negative argu-
ment: the alternative does not work. I then discuss some of
the attractive features of legal pragmatism. I complete the case
for legal pragmatism by addressing the concerns raised by some
scholars about whether pragmatism is compatible with such ju-
dicial virtues as respect for precedent and tradition, and, more
generally, with principled decision making.
A. FOUNDATIONALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
In the last fifteen years, a tremendous outpouring of schol-
arly works on constitutional theory has occurred.33 From the
right have come strong arguments for original intent as the key
to constitutional adjudication, 34 met on the left with arguments
in favor of other sources of constitutional guidance such as case
law, societal consensus, or moral philosophy.35 Although able
scholars have skillfully argued each of these approaches, no
consensus has emerged about the proper approach to judicial
review or the best basis for justifying review. Scholars have not
met the demand for a principled foundation for judicial review.
Of course, continued efforts might yet bear fruit; perhaps all we
need is a little more patience. For several reasons, however,
the foundationalist search seems unlikely to succeed.
To begin with, the flaws in existing foundationalist efforts
are deep and difficult to remedy. Originalism is vulnerable to
attacks that by now are familiar.36 Original intent is often diffi-
31. See Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 376-77
(1946) (on Cardozo); T. Grey, supra note 17, at 31-33, 71-75.
32. Brandeis has been called "perhaps the greatest practicing pragmatist
American law has known." T. Grey, supra note 17, at F18 n.265 (emphasis in
original). For a recent appraisal of his years on the bench, see Krislov, Reap-
praising Brandeis: Comments on Recent Works, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 319,
325-27 (1987).
33. Although debate about specific constitutional issues has certainly con-
tinued, much of the limelight has shifted to larger questions of judicial
legitimacy.
34. The most famous are R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-72
(1977), and Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
35. See, e.g., P. BOBBrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); J. ELY, supra note
3, at 73-104; M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 91-145; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Levinson, "The Constitution" in American
Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
36. A fuller analysis of originalism will appear in D. FARBER & S. SHERRY,
1338 [Vol. 72:1331
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cult to ascertain because of blanks in the historical record (par-
ticularly concerning the views of the ratifiers of constitutional
provisions), the divergent views of decision makers, and the
usual difficulties of interpreting any text (particularly texts of
ancient vintage).3 7 Beyond these practical problems is the ques-
tion of just what kind of intent to look for. For example, do we
look for the framers' philosophical theory of equality, their
general views of racial discrimination, their (possibly nonexis-
tent) specific views about affirmative action, or the views they
would have had about affirmative action if they had thought
about it then or if they were alive today? And more fundamen-
tally, why is the intent of the long-dead authors of the Consti-
tution binding on present-day Americans, many of whom would
have been disenfranchised in 1789 or 1866 anyway? None of
these arguments individually is devastating, but cumulatively
they make the originalist project dubious.
Although originalism is unsatisfying, its rivals have also
been subject to withering criticism.38 Nonoriginalists have
looked in various directions for the correct judicial methodol-
ogy, including a search for flaws in the political process, reli-
ance on community consensus or tradition, excursions into
political philosophy, and more recently forays into literary criti-
cism. Yet none of these approaches has proved satisfactory as
an alternative to originalism. Again, the flaws are familiar.
Each nonoriginalist method turns out to be too vague or too
controversial to serve as a foundation for judicial review. Non-
originalists also seem unable to take the constitutional text and
history sufficiently seriously. If judges can readily identify
community, or perhaps even transcendental, values, the need
for legislatures and the rest of democratic government is un-
clear. And if judges are free to create constitutional law out of
thin air, why do we bother having a written and popularly rati-
fied Constitution at all?39
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSITUTION, ch. 14 (forthcoming 1988). For a
helpful article assembling the arguments against originalism, see Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980).
37. These arguments are summarized in Brest, supra note 36, and in
Komesar, supra note 5, at 203-10.
38. The earlier attempts at nonoriginalist theory are incisively critiqued in
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). More recent
efforts relying on literary theory are demolished in Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
39. In a sense the one fundamental value the nonoriginalists cannot seem
to account for is democracy itself. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 59-60.
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The problem is not that either the originalists or their op-
ponents are completely wrong.40 Both approaches seem to have
important and useful ideas, and both approaches can be helpful
in deciding cases. But neither approach seems likely to provide
a satisfactory foundation for constitutional law. Together, con-
stitutional text, history, political philosophy, and the American
tradition may point to answers in individual cases, but none of
them standing alone can provide enough support or direction
for the practice of judicial review.41
Even if the available foundationalist theories were more vi-
able, they probably could not do the work their creators intend.
Ultimately, foundationalist theories are intended to make judi-
cial decisions more principled. In practice they seem unlikely
to have that effect for two reasons.
First, foundationalist theories are too abstract to determine
the results in particular cases. Even if all of the theoretical
problems with originalism were resolved, for example, original-
ist judges would be as likely as professional historians to differ
in their interpretations of the historical records.42 Rather than
debate the virtues and vices of affirmative action, originalist
judges would debate the proper interpretation of the debates on
the Freedman's Bureau.43 Not only would the results likely re-
flect political predispositions, but the real values at stake would
be concealed beneath historiographic debates.4 Nonoriginalist
judges likewise could find themselves engaged in equally un-
productive debates about the proper reading of Kant or
Locke.45
Second, unless a majority of the members of the Court
agree on a single version of foundationalism, foundationalism
can lead to inconsistent and therefore unprincipled judicial out-
40. My reason for dismissing them so cursorily here is not that these theo-
ries are unimportant, but just that their flaws are so well known. Despite
these flaws, both originalism and, its competing theories have much to offer.
41. Ely devastatingly criticizes each individual nonoriginalist methodol-
ogy, see J. ELY, supra note 3, at 43-72, but never discusses the possibility of
their functioning jointly. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 191-92.
42. Presumably, if constitutional interpretation were purely a matter of
historical research, we would do better to turn constitutional law over to the
American Historical Association rather than the Supreme Court.
43. See Belz, The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution: The Rele-
vance of Original Intent, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 115, 137 (1988).
44. For a vigorous but ultimately unsuccessful defense of originalism, see
Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 43 (1987).
45. Ely imagines the following judicial opinion: "We like Rawls, you like
Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated." J. ELY, supra note 3, at 58.
1340 [Vol. 72:1331
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comes. Whenever three or more theories are present on the
Court, the possibility exists for cycles in which proponents of
the various theories form shifting coalitions, leading to a pat-
tern of outcomes consistent with none of the theories.46 Consti-
tutional law-viewed as a set of outcomes-might well be more
consistent and principled if the Justices took into account from
the beginning the differing views of their colleagues, rather
than sticking to their own foundationalist theories.47
Besides failing to make judicial decision making more prin-
cipled, the foundationalist project might also fail to achieve an-
other of its major goals, making judicial review acceptable in a
democracy. Rigorously foundationalist Justices, being less will-
ing to compromise their views with those held by other
branches of government or major social groups-and unwilling
to be swayed by the intensely held views of other Justices-
very well might be seen as zealots rather than prophets, impos-
ing a narrow sectarian political creed on the rest of society.
Having embraced a global constitutional theory, the Court
would also find it more difficult to make adjustments as society
changed. Thus, a Court obsessed with theoretical consistency
might be less able to play a useful role in the practical tasks of
democratic government.48
B. THE PRAGMATIST ALTERNATIVE
The heart of pragmatist thought is the view that the ulti-
mate test is always experience.49 The truth of propositions is to
be tested by their "cash value," James said, that is, their conse-
quences in terms of our experiences. 50 Similarly, according to
46. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802,
826 (1982). "There is no reason why we cannot ask each Justice to develop a
principled jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently. What we cannot do
is ask the same of the Court, as an institution." Id. at 832.
47. See Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETmics 834, 847-48 (1987).
48. See Kronman, Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 17, at 1589-
1603.
49. See, e.g., PHILOsOPHICAL WRrrINGs OF PIERCE 5 (J. Buchler ed. 1955)
("experience alone teaches anything"). The picture most congenial to the
pragmatist is not the thinker contemplating the Absolute in his study, but the
mechanic grappling with a tough repair job in the machine shop. No founda-
tional view can tell the mechanic in advance how to solve every problem.
50. See W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM 95-113 (1975). The following passage sum-
marizes his view:
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant an
idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its be-
ing true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized?
What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if
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Dewey, the value of art rests in its ability to enrich the human
experience. 51
Pragmatism seems especially congenial to the legal mind.
Like the pragmatist philosophers,5 2 lawyers are trained to
be highly suspicious of glittering generalities and abstract theo-
ries. Holmes's adage that the life of the law is experience
rather than logic 5 3 summarizes much of the lawyer's creed.
The case method used in law schools, at its best, forces students
to think about specific cases rather than general rulesM-think -
ing things rather than words, to paraphrase another
Holmesianism. 55
Pragmatism has several advantages as an approach to con-
stitutional law. First, pragmatism responds to our sense that
some constitutional problems are simply hard and unresponsive
to any preset formula; it may take all of our intelligence and
creativity to devise an acceptable solution. Foundational grand
theories aspire to make constitutional law easy by providing a
single recipe for all decisions-a recipe, moreover, that will
never require change, no matter how much society evolves.
Foundationalist analysis supposes that the genuine conflicts
that underlie many constitutional cases will dissolve. Pragma-
tism, however, acknowledges that there are real conflicts that
have to be squarely confronted rather than finessed.56
Second, pragmatism is a politically healthier approach to
the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in ex-
periential terms?"
Id. at 97; see PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PIERCE, supra note 49, at 25, 29-31,
252, 290.
51. J. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 85, 117, 344-46 (1934).
52. James stated:
A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of
inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away
from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a
priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended
absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy,
towards facts, towards action, and towards power.... [This] means
the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality
and the pretence of finality in truth.
W. JAMES, supra note 50, at 31.
53. 0. HOLMEs, supra note 1, at 312; see also id. at 213 ("Law, being a prac-
tical thing, must found itself on actual forces.").
54. See Merryman, Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27
STAN. L. REV. 859, 873-75 (1975).
55. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 238 (1920).
56. Pragmatism also allows judges to use every available intellectual tool
to solve constitutional problems. Foundationalists seek to isolate some privi-
leged set of constitutional techniques-whether they be the techniques of liter-
ary criticism, political philosophy, or historical analysis. Constitutional
[Vol. 72:13311342
LEGAL PRAGMATISM
constitutional law. By encouraging incremental decision mak-
ing rather than global remedies, pragmatism reduces the risk of
unjustified radical intrusions into social institutions, and in-
creases the possibility of dialogue between the Court and other
segments of society. It also allows judges to appeal to a broad
range of values, rather than restricting them to a single source
of normative support. For example, majoritarianism is a pow-
erful American value, as both originalists and process theorists
insist.5 7 Yet a judicial decision may be stronger if it does not
rely exclusively on majoritarianism, because other widely
shared values may have a more decisive bearing in cases in
which the implications of majoritarianism are ambiguous. By
appealing to a broader web of values, the judge may be better
able to build consensus.
Third, although pragmatism is not solely concerned with
the utilitarian consequences of judicial decisions, it does prompt
a healthy concern about the societal impact of law.58 Too often,
judges seem unconcerned about the societal effects of constitu-
tional rules. For example, the Supreme Court struck down the
legislative veto while explicitly disclaiming any interest in
whether that device had promoted the goals of democratic self-
government.59 Similarly, in recent busing cases, the Court has
never evidenced any concern about whether busing has func-
tioned effectively to promote racial equality in education. 60
This is not to say that the results of these cases were wrong,
but the Court could profitably give more thought to whether its
decisions actually further societal goals such as freedom, equal-
ity, and democracy.
Despite these virtues legal pragmatism has come under se-
rious attack. Critics charge that it is inconsistent with respect
toward precedent, history, and legal texts; that it is incompa-
tible with strong enforcement of individual rights; and that it
leads to unprincipled and inconsistent judicial decisions.
The most vehement of the recent critics has been Ronald
Dworkin. In a recent book, he attacks legal pragmatism as es-
sentially unprincipled:
problems are difficult enough without deciding in advance to rule certain tech-
niques off limits.
57. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 63-69.
58. See T. Grey, supra note 17, at 7-9.
59. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
60. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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The pragmatist takes a skeptical attitude toward the assumption we
are assuming is embodied in the concept of law: he denies that past
political decisions in themselves provide any justification for either
using or withholding the state's coercive power. He finds the neces-
sary justification for coercion in the justice or efficiency or some other
contemporary virtue of the coercive decision itself, as and when it is
made by judges, and he adds that consistency with any past legislative
or judicial decision does not in principle contribute to the justice or
virtue of any present one. If judges are guided by this advice, he be-
lieves, then unless they make great mistakes, the coercion they direct
will make the community's future brighter, liberated from the dead
hand of the past and the fetish of consistency for its own sake.
61
In its most "virulent" form, Dworkin says, pragmatism becomes
activism: "[a]n activist justice would ignore the Constitution's
text, the history of its enactment, prior decisions of the
Supreme Court interpreting it, and long-standing traditions of
our political culture. ' 62 The activist would "ignore all these in
order to impose on other branches of government his own view
of what justice demands. '63 The less virulent pragmatist,
Dworkin observes, does pay some attention to precedent, not
for its own sake but because of the social interest in legal stabil-
ity and predictability.64
Dworkin's understanding of pragmatism as a form of in-
strumentalism is shared even by some authors more sympa-
thetic to pragmatism.65 His understanding is nevertheless quite
mistaken. The pragmatist philosophers were keenly sensitive
to the importance of tradition, not just as an instrumental value
but as a necessary ingredient in all human reasoning.66 For the
pragmatists, tradition was not, as Dworkin would have it, the
"dead hand of the past," but rather the essential foundation for
intellectual and social progress. Consistency with the past is, as
Holmes said, as much a necessity as a virtue, for "[t]he past
gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagina-
61. R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 151 (1986); see also id. at 95 (Under prag-
matism, judges would "make whatever decisions seem to them best for the
community's future, not counting any form of consistency with the past as val-
uable for its own sake.").
62. Id. at 378.
63. 1&
64. Id. at 158.
65. See West, supra note 17, at 724-29 (arguing that pragmatism is instru-
mentalist and rejects tradition as source of moral authority).
66. This does not mean, of course, that a pragmatist judge must always re-
spect precedent rather than basing decisions on broader principles. A "return
to first principles" is essentially a rejection of a narrow part of the tradition to
be faithful to a broader vision of that tradition.
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tion. '6 7 According to the pragmatists, the mind is never a
blank sheet; it is always structured by experience and culture.68
Thus, according to Dewey, creativity and innovation do not
arise from a rejection of tradition but rather from a full em-
brace of it:
"Schools" of art are more marked in sculpture, architecture, and
painting than in the literary arts. But there has been no great literary
artist who did not feed upon the works of the masters of drama, po-
etry, and eloquent prose. In this dependence upon tradition there is
nothing peculiar to art. The scientific inquirer, the philosopher, the
technologist, also derive their substance from the stream of culture.
This dependence is an essential factor in original vision and creative
expression. The trouble with the academic imitator is not that he de-
pends upon traditions, but that the latter have not entered into his
mind; into the structure of his own ways of seeing and making. They
remain upon the surface as tricks of technique or as extraneous sug-
gestions and conventions as to the proper thing to do.69
Similarly, pragmatist judges would not simply view existing law
as a constraint or as a factor in a utilitarian analysis. Instead,
they would have already internalized it as part of their own
way of thinking.70
Dworkin's error stems from a common confusion between
pragmatism and forms of instrumentalism such as utilitarian-
ism.71 Dewey, for example, strongly attacked instrumentalism
for assuming that goals and means could be separated. As he
explained, the means used are themselves part of the conse-
quences of a decision and therefore must be assessed in making
a choice. 72 For instance, a "good political constitution, honest
police-system, and competent judiciary, are means of the pros-
perous life of the community because they are integrated por-
tions of that life."73 They are not, in other words, simply ways
of promoting other social benefits; they are also social benefits
67. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 55, at 139.
68. See W. JAMES, supra note 50, at 35, 83, 104, 119; PHILOSOPHICAL WRIT-
INGS OF PIERCE, supra note 49, at 256.
69. J. DEWEY, supra note 51, at 265. Earlier in the book, Dewey observes
that great artists digest rather than shun tradition. Id. at 159.
70. A similar view is expressed in R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM
AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 77, 129-31, 142 (1983).
71. For another example from a sympathetic student of pragmatism, see
West, supra note 17, at 724-28; see also i& at 735 (citing Bentham, a founder of
utilitarianism, to explain the pragmatist perspective on the abortion issue). A
similar misreading of Lon Fuller's work is criticized in Teachout, supra note
17.
72. J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 361-63, 367-68 (1925). Holmes
shared this view. See T. Grey, supra note 17, at 82.
73. J. DEWEY, supra note 72, at 367.
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in themselves.7 4
The difference between the Dworkinian judge and the
pragmatist is not that the pragmatist views the past as a dead
hand. Rather, unlike Dworkin's mythical judge Hercules,75 the
pragmatist does not purport to be an outside observer of legal
texts, seeking the proper interpretation. For the pragmatist,
existing law is not primarily a collection of texts that requires a
struggle to interpret, but rather a way of thought that a judge
has internalized.76 Rather than being constrained by existing
law, the pragmatist judge is empowered by the legal tradi-
tion77-without it, the judge would hardly know how to begin
to think about deciding cases.78
Another common objection to legal pragmatism is that it is
inconsistent with full recognition of legal rights. Dworkin, for
example, contends that the pragmatist does not really believe
that people have rights. Only as a strategic matter, he says,
74. The pragmatist judge, then, views the written opinion not just as a
way of obtaining other social goods, but also as an activity worth doing well for
its own sake. Because the judge is part of an ongoing legal tradition, the rela-
tionship of the judge's decisions to that tradition is an essential part of evaluat-
ing them.
75. Hercules is "an imaginary judge of superhuman intellectual power
and patience," R. DWORKIN, supra note 61, at 239, who carries out Dworkin's
jurisprudential program. In Dworkin's view a judge should attempt to con-
struct a global interpretation of all existing legal texts that both makes them
consistent with each other and also makes the legal system the best possible
system consistent with these texts. See id. at 225-58. Dworkin summarized his
position as follows:
Judges who accept [his view] decide hard cases by trying to find, in
some coherent set of principles about people's rights and duties, the
best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal
doctrine of their community. They try to make that complex struc-
ture and record the best these can be.
Id. at 255. In short, for Dworkin, a judge is someone who develops a successful
interpretive theory that covers existing legal materials and then applies it to
particular cases. From a pragmatic point of view, what is most problematic
about this perspective is that it portrays the judge as someone standing outside
of and theorizing about society, rather than as an active participant in that
society.
76. When someone expresses concern that a potential judicial nominee
"lacks the judicial temperament" or is "too ideological" or "not in the main-
stream," .he real issue is often whether the potential nominee has really inter-
nalized legal thought, or merely goes through the motions of legal analysis to
justify results reached on other grounds.
77. Similar views are expressed in Black, Reflections on Teaching and
Working in Constitutional Law, 66 OR. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1987); Fish, Anti-Pro-
fessionalism, 7 CARDozo L. REV. 645, 670 (1986).
78. This critique of Dworkin is forcefully presented in Fish, supra note 17,
at 1780-81, 1785-94.
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does the pragmatist act "as if" people had rights.79 It is true
that the pragmatist does not view rights as part of the ontologi-
cal furniture of the world, having some existence independent"
of particular human societies. To discover whether the mem-
bers of an isolated tribe have legal rights, we have to go talk to
them; we cannot find the answer by reading Rawls, Nozick, or
Dworkin. But living in a society that does recognize the exist-
ence of legal rights, the American pragmatist need not view
those rights as purely instrumental means of acquiring other
goods. For, as we have already seen, the pragmatist is commit-
ted to denying the dichotomy between ends and means.
A related question is whether pragmatism is compatible
with full support for constitutional rights against majoritarian
legislation. Several authors have argued that utilitarianism is
inconsistent with judicial protection of constitutional rights, in
terms that might seem to apply to pragmatism as well. The ar-
gument is that utilitarianism makes individual happiness the
test for social decisions, and voters are better able to register
their preferences at the ballot box than judges are able to dis-
cern those preferences.80 Moreover, all preferences have
equivalent value so long as their fulfillment makes people
happy, so courts cannot distinguish between fundamental
human values and any other form of social gratification.81
This argument is of doubtful validity even against utilitari-
anism,8 2 but is clearly invalid as applied to pragmatism. The
pragmatist is not committed to viewing all gratifications as
equal. Instead, the pragmatist seeks to promote an evolving
picture of human flourishing.83 And it is quite foreign to the
spirit of pragmatism to say that some one method, such as ma-
jority voting, is a priori the best way to promote social welfare.
Like all other questions, the question of how to promote a
flourishing society for the pragmatist is to be answered as much
by experience than theory.s4
For the pragmatist, then, the question of the advisability of
judicial review turns on its usefulness for promoting a flourish-
79. R. DWORKIN, supra note 61, at 152-53 (emphasis in original).
80. See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism" Its Allure and Impossibility,
53 IND. L.J. 399, 404-06 (1978).
81. Bork, supra note 34, at 10-11.
82. For a persuasive rebuttal of this argument, at least as applied to John
Stuart Mill, see West, In the Interest of the Governed-- A Utilitarian Justifica-
tion for Substantive Judicial Review, 18 GA. L. REv. 469 (1984).
83. This point is persuasively made in West, supra note 17, at 693-701.
84. See J. DEWEY, supra note 28, at 145-46, 202-03.
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ing democratic society-democratic not just in the sense of bal-
lot casting but also in the sense that citizens are in charge of
the intelligent development of their lives.8 5 Has judicial review
promoted such a society? The record over the past two centu-
ries has been ambiguous, but on the whole judicial review
seems to have worked. In any event, for the pragmatist, the
question is not a pressing one.8 6 Judicial review is a part of our
social system, and the live questions do not involve musty, theo-
retical disputes about its legitimacy or desirability, but acutely
pressing disputes about its proper exercise.8 7
As to whether pragmatism is consistent with a true com-
mitment to rights such as free speech, the answer is surely yes.
Pragmatists such as Dewey placed great faith in the ability of
individuals to grow and control their lives intelligently. This
faith leads to a corresponding enthusiasm about freedom of ex-
pression.88 Moreover, because the pragmatist does not feel the
foundationalist need to isolate a single value in support of the
first amendment, the amendment can be tied to a broad range
of social goods such as the functioning of the democratic pro-
cess, development of the arts, progress in the sciences, protec-
tion of minorities, as well as an appreciation of free speech as a
value in and of itself.8 9 For those who doubt that pragmatic
judges can be expected to do battle for great constitutional
principles like free speech, the example of Justice Brandeis is
again instructive.90
One final question is whether pragmatism leads to ad hoc
85. See id. at 111, 125-35, 143-45, 147-49; West, supra note 17, at 717.
86. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 185, 187-88.
87. As Grey states:
The truth is that there is just enough of a case for the legitimacy
of supplemental judicial review to convince those of us who already
believe that, on the whole, the practice produces somewhat better re-
sults than would occur in its absence. This modest precedential de-
fense at least does not oversell the product by presupposing, with
little justification, that our political life would be both very different
and very much worse than it is were it not for judicial review.
Grey, supra note 38, at 20. Grey invokes the Burkean presumption that any
long-standing social practice probably serves some useful purpose.
88. See J. DEWEY, supra note 28, at 166-71, 176-84, 208-09; West, supra note
17, at 717, 731.
89. Phil Frickey and I have discussed this point at length in a recent arti-
cle. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 16, at 1639-56.
90. On Brandeis as a pragmatist, see supra note 32. For Brandeis's stir-
ring defense of free speech, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
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decisions, lacking any coherence or attachment to principle.9 1
Dewey certainly thought not. Indeed, he stressed the impor-
tance of system in law, so as to make law as coherent and pre-
dictable as possible.92 The difference between the pragmatist
and the foundationalist is not that the pragmatist disavows
legal theory, but rather that the pragmatist takes no position in
advance about how broad in scope such theory should be. Can
we have a unified theory of all private law, all contract law, and
all promissory estoppel cases, or perhaps only promissory estop-
pel cases dealing with promises of pension benefits to employ-
ees? For the pragmatist, the only way to answer this question
is to decide cases, try to construct theories, and determine what
level of generality works best. The pragmatist would like as
much system as possible but is agnostic about how much this
will really turn out to be.
The real test for legal pragmatism-on pragmatist terms!-
is not whether it can meet these theoretical objections, but
whether it works, in the sense of providing the basis for a per-
suasive analysis of concrete constitutional problems. The re-
mainder of this Article attempts to provide a pragmatist
perspective on a difficult constitutional problem. The goal is
not, of course, definitively to resolve the problem, but rather to
identify a viable (if provisional) solution.
II. A PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DEBATE
As John Ely has pointed out, much of the contemporary
debate about the foundations of constitutional law is really a
debate about Roe v. Wade93 and the related line of privacy
cases.9 4 The attack immediately made against Roe was that the
Court had simply resurrected the "old" substantive due process
of the Lochner v. New York 95 period, in which the Court read
freedom of contract into the Constitution as a fundamental
right. Today, a new wrinkle has been added to the debate by
arguments that economic liberty does indeed deserve a greater
degree of constitutional protection than it currently receives.
Analytically, the fundamental rights debate can be broken
91. This is the charge made in Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections
on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1436, 1437, 1455 (1987).
92. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 19, 24-25 (1924).
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 2-3.
95. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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down into three questions. First, is the entire idea of funda-
mental rights justifiable? Second, is economic freedom such a
fundamental right? Or in other words, was Lochner really
wrong? And third, what about Roe--can it really be distin-
guished from Lochner?
A. THE LEGITIMACY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
There is no doubt that a court enforcing the first amend-
ment may have to address thorny issues and that the answers
are often controversial. But a court deciding a first amendment
case does have the assurance that the Constitution has some-
thing to say about the case. How to apply the first amendment
may be difficult, but at least no one doubts that the Constitu-
tion really does protect some forms of speech.
When we leave the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights,
however, the very relevance of the Constitution becomes ques-
tionable. Before even addressing what the Constitution has to
say about abortion, for example, we have to face grave doubts
about whether it has anything to say about the matter. Before
considering whether specific rights are fundamental, it be-
hooves us to consider whether courts should ever enforce rights
that are not specifically designated in the Constitution.
For a pragmatist the analysis must start-but not finish-
with an examination of our constitutional text, history, and tra-
ditions. The text itself strongly suggests that additional,
nonenumerated rights exist. In particular, the ninth amend-
ment seems quite explicit: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people. '96 The fourteenth
amendment's reference to "privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States"97 also implies the existence of some cate-
gory of unspecified rights.
History also supports the recognition of fundamental
rights. Natural rights concepts permeated American thought in
the revolutionary period.98 To take just a few scattered exam-
ples, the most notable embodiment of the natural rights view is
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. For an extensive discussion of this history, see Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); see also B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 184-89 (1967); B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT 3-123 (1931).
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the Declaration of Independence itself. Another famous exam-
ple is James Otis's argument against the right of Parliament to
authorize writs of assistance: "As to Acts of Parliament, an Act
against the Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity
is void: and if an Act of Parliament should be made, in the very
Words of this Petition, it would be void. The Executive Courts
must pass such Acts into disuse."9 9 Similarly, in protesting the
Stamp Act, the Whigs turned to the courts for support, con-
tending that the Act was unconstitutional and therefore void. 00
Some recent historical scholarship suggests that the belief
in natural law as a judicially enforceable restriction on legisla-
tures persisted into the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. 01 Under this view enforcement of natural rights by
courts would not even require a textual basis. In any event the
enactment of the ninth amendment seems to provide just such
a textual basis for fundamental rights.10 2 Indeed, the existence
of fundamental rights was implicit in the Federalist argument
against the need for a Bill of Rights. No Bill of Rights was nec-
essary, the Federalists contended, because the federal govern-
ment had only limited powers.'03 This argument makes no
sense if each of the enumerated powers is considered to be free
of any implicit limitation. For example, without some notion
that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce does not
extend to bans on the interstate shipment of religious books, it
is difficult to see how Congress's having only a limited number
of powers could eliminate the need for explicit protection for
religious freedom.'0 4
99. Grey, supra note 98, at 869 (quoting 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
521-22 (C. Adams ed. 1850)).
100. 1d at 879-81.
101. See, e.g., Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm1. L.
REV. 1127 (1987).
102. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 33-41.
103. See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 36, ch. 8; 2 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADAPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION 435-37 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; THE FED.
ERALIST No. 84, at 578-79 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Indeed, the
Federalists went farther, contending that a Bill of Rights would actually be
dangerous because it would be construed to limit otherwise valid rights that
were not on the list. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 626 (Madison); 1 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 439, 732 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
104. Ely suggests that some laws would be universally regarded as barbaric,
so that any reasonable civilized judge would feel morally impelled to resign
rather than enforce them. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 182-83. Given the
Framers' desire to create a federal government of limited powers, however, it
seems unlikely that they would have intended to delegate the power to engage
in incontestably barbaric conduct. There is no reason to believe that the Bill
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There is also substantial historical evidence that the natu-
ral law tradition influenced the drafters of the fourteenth
amendment.10 5 The idea of higher law was deeply embedded in
the jurisprudence of the time, particularly in what was then
called the law of nations, a term that included a variety of sub-
jects such as public international law, conflict of laws, and even
parts of commercial law.106 The antislavery Republicans, in-
cluding Abraham Lincoln, placed great credence in the Decla-
ration of Independence, with its natural law philosophy.
Although the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment
is sparse, there were extensive debates on the closely related
Civil Rights Act, in which fundamental rights figured promi-
nently.10 7 For example, Senator Trumbull, in a major speech
defending the bill after President Johnson's veto, asserted that
[t]o be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights;...
They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citi-
zens or free men in all countries, such as the right enumerated in this
bill, and they belong to them in all the States of the Union. The right
of American citizenship means something.
1 08
The fundamental rights idea also has been a continuing
theme in Supreme Court decisions'10 9 Early decisions by Chief
Justice Marshall and others had a strong natural law tinge.110
of Rights was intended as a complete catalogue of all unacceptable governmen-
tal abuses; the language of the ninth amendment strongly suggests the
contrary.
105. For a recent survey of the evidence and the scholarly literature, see
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 890-928 (1986).
106. See Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235, 24146 (1984). The grip of this con-
cept on the judicial mind is illustrated by Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
517 (1855), in which the Supreme Court refused to follow a Mississippi negotia-
ble instruments statute in a Mississippi case because the statute was contrary
to the law of nations. Id. at 520.
107. Farber & Muench, supra note 106, at 246-51. Bingham, who drafted
the fourteenth amendment, adhered to a belief in the higher law. See CONG.
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 83 (1861).
108. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). For other similar
statements by Trumbull, see id. at 319, 322, 476, 600. Chase, who was later to
be Chief Justice, also expressed natural law views. See THE ANTISLAVERY AR-
GUMENT 391-92 (W. Pease & J. Pease eds. 1965) (" 'No court is bound to enforce
unjust law."' (quoting Chase)).
109. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 43, 50 (1815) (Story, J.);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 139 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388, 394 (1798). See generally, Nelson, The Impact of the Antislav-
ery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century
America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513, 530-31 (1974).
110. See Sherry, supra note 101, at 1167-76.
1352 [Vol. 72:1331
LEGAL PRAGMATISM
From the late nineteenth century through the present, the
Court has viewed the due process clause as embodying those
rights fundamental to citizens of a free country. This formula-
tion, which received its most notable modem phrasing in Jus-
tice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut,"' was also the
basis for the selective incorporation doctrine, under which most
of the Bill of Rights was read into the fourteenth amend-
ment.1u And this formulation also figured in Justice Harlan's
discussion of the right of privacy, in which he said the four-
teenth amendment was intended to embrace fundamental
rights "'which belong ... to the citizens of all free govern-
ments,' for 'the purposes' of securing 'which men enter into so-
ciety.' "113 This language is remarkably like that used by
Senator Trumbull almost exactly a century earlier.
For a pragmatist, precedent and original intent count but
are not decisive. The pragmatist must also ask whether the
idea of fundamental rights works, whether it produces better
results for society. Putting aside the question of judicial en-
forcement for the moment, the concept of fundamental rights
appears to be a useful one. It reminds citizens and legislators
that a democracy does not seek total control of its citizens. It
recognizes that people, both as individuals and as members of
families and other institutions, need room to experiment and
grow. The fundamental rights concept is a useful reminder of
the value of individual freedom.
A more troublesome question is whether courts should en-
force fundamental rights against the actions of other govern-
mental bodies. There is no evading two strong arguments
against judicial enforcement: it is subject to abuse, and it al-
ways involves some sacrifice of our strong belief in majority
rule.
These are powerful arguments for caution, but they do not
support complete judicial withdrawal. As the Federalists said
in the debates on the Constitution, any power can be abused,
but this fear in itself cannot be sufficient to justify eliminating
a governmental power.'1 4 As to what is called the "counter-
111. 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
112. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
113. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) and
Calder, 3 U.S. at 388).
114. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 36, ch. 7; Ellsworth, The Land-
holde7, No. 3 (Nov. 19, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTIrrTUoN 303,
304 (P. Kirkland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
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majoritarian difficulty," this is always a problem, but some-
times more so than others. For example, the Court in enforc-
ing the fundamental right may be intervening to correct a
breakdown in the normal process of representation. 115 Or, the
decision in question may be an aberration issuing from some ec-
centric local government and contrary to a clear national
consensus.
116
Moreover, although majority rule is obviously a very good
thing,117 it is contrary to the spirit of pragmatism to transform
this observation into an absolute.118 Majority rule is desirable,
but invariable adherence to majority rule may not be wise.
Sometimes slavish adherence to the norm of majority rule may
involve unacceptable sacrifices of other critically important val-
ues.119 Unless we place an infinite value on majority rule,
there must be some situation in which a small intrusion on this
value is justified to avoid a major loss of some other value. 2 0
The remaining argument against legal recognition of fun-
damental rights is that made by Bork and Ely: there simply is
no way a court can distinguish a fundamental right from any
other personal interest. In its strong form, as made by Bork,'2 '
this argument is untenable. As a society we do share some no-
tions about the relative importance of various personal inter-
115. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 105-79.
116. See Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights
Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV.
587, 632-34 (1985). One notable example is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), discussed in infra note 180. Another example is Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), in which the Court struck down a local
zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with two of her
grandchildren, because the two were cousins rather than siblings. Although
the Court did take issue with the results of the democratic political process of
one small city, it seems doubtful that the result intruded on the views of a na-
tionwide majority. On the contrary, the Court was bringing a deviant locality
into line with a firm national consensus. Rhetoric about the
countermajoritarian difficulty just does not ring true on these facts.
117. As Ely demonstrates, this is probably the one point about government
on which Americans most agree. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 5-7.
118. The fallacy in Ely's powerful argument against fundamental rights is
his shift from the truth that Americans view majority rule as generally the
best way to decide issues to the fallacy that we always view it this way. See
id., supra note 3, at 59-60.
119. As Ely concedes, the Framers did think that some substantive values,
such as freedom of religion, should not be left to majority control. See id.,
supra note 3, at 94-95.
120. The example of Moore, which is discussed supra note 116, is also appo-
site here. The damage to the norm of democratic self-government was minor,
while the countervailing value was powerful.
121. See Bork, supra note 34, at 10.
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ests. Few people seriously think, for example, that the right to
eat popcorn is as important as the right to medical care.
Ely's version of this argument, however, is more difficult to
answer. Ely contends that on the kinds of issues that actually
will come before courts, when a majority has chosen to invade
an arguably fundamental right, courts have no principled way
of determining whether the right should be considered funda-
mental.122 For the pragmatist the best way to answer Ely is not
to contest his theoretical objections directly, but rather to see if
fundamental rights analysis works. The best way to find out
whether it is possible to draw principled distinctions is to try to
draw them. The next two sections attempt to do just that.
B. ECONOMIC LIBERTY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Today, Lochner is one of the ogres of constitutional law,
mostly used as an epithet to hurl at opposing constitutional the-
orists.123 The question whether its approach should be resur-
rected nevertheless deserves attention. Scholars have recently
argued for a renewed judicial activism in scrutinizing economic
legislation. Although the most notable of these scholars is
Richard Epstein,n2' a prominent conservative, others are cen-
trists or liberals. 2 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court has begun to
enforce more vigorously the specific constitutional provisions
protecting vested property rights, 2 6 suggesting the possibility
122. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 50-54, 58-59, 66-69.
123. Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Conscious-
ness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. LAW
AND Soc. 3, 10 (1980).
124. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985); Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause,
51 U. Cm. L. REV. 703 (1984). Professor Bernard Siegan is another outspoken
libertarian advocate of Lochnerism. See B. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME CouR'rs
CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY NmO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCI-
ETY 41-88 (1987); B. SiEGAN, EcONOMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrrTION
(1980); Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453 (1985). Sie-
gan was nominated for the U.S. Court of Appeals by President Reagan. See
An Injudicious Choice for Judge, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1988, at 26, col. 1 (city
ed.). In contrast to Siegan, another prominent conservative has been an out-
spoken critic of the attempt to resurrect Lochner. See Bork, The Constitution,
Original Inten4 and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986).
125. See Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CoNST. COMMENTARY 169
(1988); Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public
Law, 54 TuL. L. REV. 849 (1980); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 68-85 (1985).
126. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987). In land use cases, re-
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that the Court might be open to persuasion by these arguments
for increased protection for all economic interests. 27 Finally,
any analysis of Roe can hardly avoid confronting the question of
Lochner.
The argument for economic activism comes in three forms.
One is based on a natural law theory of property rights and in-
dividual economic freedom. Another, based on current eco-
nomic theories, contends that legislation should be struck down
unless it is at least arguably justified by some kind of market
failure. Laws that transfer wealth from one group to another,
rather than increasing total social wealth, are labeled rent-seek-
ing and considered undesirable. A final argument is a less rig-
orous attack on rent-seeking that would allow the legislature to
promote a broader range of public values but that would strike
down laws outside of this range.
1. The Natural Law Theory
Richard Epstein is the primary proponent of the natural
law theory of property rights and individual economic free-
dom. 128 I will not undertake a detailed philosophical critique of
his natural law position for two reasons.129 First, as a pragma-
tist, I simply do not believe in the possibility of deducing uni-
versal moral principles from unquestionable premises. Second,
as a lawyer, I regard the philosophical question as somewhat
beside the point. The question, after all, is not whether it is
morally wrong for legislatures to engage in economic regula-
strictions on future activities are not always easy to distinguish from takings of
present vested rights. As a result these cases have led to fear of a Lochner re-
vival. See McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": The Remarkable Resurrection of
Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10369 (1987).
127. Some lower federal court judges seemingly have some degree of sym-
pathy with arguments for increased judicial protection of property rights. See
Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741-45 (7th Cir. 1987)
(separate opinion of Posner, J., joined by Easterbrook, J.); Illinois Psychologi-
cal Ass'n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1341 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.). Judge Posner
does not, however, accept Epstein's libertarian activism. See Posner, The Con-
stitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 4, 20-24 (1987).
128. Epstein's views are summarized in Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41
U. MIAMI L. REy. 3 (1986).
129. The interested reader will find a powerful critique of Epstein's natural
law theory in Kelman, Book Review, 74 CALiF. L. REv. 1829, 1833-44 (1986).
The connection between autonomy and property control, which Epstein sim-
plistically identifies, is explored more realistically in Baker, Property and Its
Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986).
In recent speeches, I am told, Epstein has de-emphasized natural law as the
basis of his approach.
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tion, but rather whether a court should hold such regulations
unconstitutional.
In analyzing the constitutional issue, the starting point is
again the language and history of the Constitution. The Consti-
tution does show some regard for property rights and also re-
flects the suspicion that some kinds of economic regulation,
such as impairments of contracts, are economically harmful.130
Nevertheless, the specific provisions in the Constitution dealing
with economic rights all concern vested property rights;131 that
is, they protect assets already acquired by individuals rather
than the opportunity to acquire future assets. This is not, of
course, to say'that they preclude a broader libertarian interpre-
tation, but they certainly do not mandate it.
Moreover, the idea of natural economic rights is contrary
to much of our tradition. Benjamin Franklin, for example,
once said that "'Private Property... is a Creature of Society,
and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessi-
ties shall require it, even to its last Farthing; its contributions
therefore to the public Exigencies are.., to be considered...
the Return of an obligation previously received, or the Pay-
ment of a just Debt.' "132 Franklin's views were typical of the
colonial and revolutionary period.'3 Even when Lockean indi-
vidualism became more prominent in the period before the
framing of the Constitution, it was not understood to entail ab-
solute property rights. The just compensation clause, for exam-
ple, was narrowly understood to involve only physical seizure
of property by the government.'3
One of the most influential discussions of fundamental
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall... coin Money; emit Bills
of Credit;... pass any, . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... );
id. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of... property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
131. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 248-49 (J. Madison) (E. Scott ed. 1894)
(viewing impairment of contracts clause as "constitutional bulwark in favor of
personal security and private rights").
132. Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 700 (1985) (quoting B.
FRANKLIN, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (A. Smythe
ed. 1907)).
133. See F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SEcLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORI-
GINS OF THE CONsTrTUTIoN 22-25 (1986); Note, supra note 132, at 695-701.
134. See Note, supra note 132, at 710-16; cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 211 (1796) ("[Plroperty is the creature of civil society, and subject, in all
respects, to the disposition and control of civil institutions.").
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rights-a discussion prominently cited by the Framers of the
fourteenth amendment' 3 5-is found in Justice Washington's
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell. 36 Among the rights he listed
were "[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; sub-
ject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may
justly prescribe for the general good of the whole."'137 Thus,
like Blackstone and Locke,1 38 Washington considered economic
liberty not as an absolute natural right, but rather as inher-
ently qualified by the public good. Governmental regulation of
the market, and programs intended to redistribute wealth were
fairly widespread in the period between independence and the
framing of the fourteenth amendment, indeed up to the Loch-
ner period itself. 39 The constitutional status that Lochner con-
ferred on economic liberty was a recent innovation, with little
basis in previous law,140 and held sway for only about thirty
years.
Turning from tradition to contemporary consensus, we find
widespread acceptance of pervasive governmental regulation.
Adopting Epstein's views would mean abolishing national labor
laws, the minimum wage, occupational safety legislation, and
many other unquestioned government regulations.' 41 Epstein
concedes that some statutes he regards as unconstitutional are
too deeply entrenched in our society to be dislodged.'4
More fundamentally, however, these laws are too deeply
embedded in our common sense conception of property143 and
135. See Farber & Muench, supra note 106, at 265-66.
136. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
137. Id. at 551-52.
138. See Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAM L. REV. 21, 46
(1986). Epstein's misreading of Locke is discussed in Schwartz, Property
Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM.
U.L. REV. 9, 14-19 (1987); Note, Richard Epstein on the Foundations of Tak-
ings Jurisprudence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 791, 797-807 (1986).
139. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 157-78, 187-91 (1973)
(discussing poor relief, government spending, and government regulation);
Grey, supra note 138, at 41-48 (discussing the long Anglo-American tradition
of poor relief); Schwartz, supra note 138, at 19-24. Epstein himself concedes
that his view on welfare programs "surely runs against much of our political
tradition." Epstein, supra note 128, at 18.
140. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court The Protection of
Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. C. L. REV. 324, 326, 378-82 (1985).
141. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 327-28; Grey, supra note 138, at 23;
Schwartz, supra note 138, at 32-33.
142. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 324-29.
143. This has been called "social property," that is, property as understood
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liberty to be ignored. Given this background of pervasive and
accepted governmental intervention, the idea of a natural right
to be free from all governmental interference is simply foreign
to our culture.14 We can hardly imagine what our lives-or
property ownership, for that matter-would be like without
this pervasive aspect of our society. To say that we were born
with economic liberty but are now enslaved by governmental
regulation seems as eccentric as saying that "fish were born to
fly but everywhere they swim."
145
2. Rent-seeking
The rent-seeking approach is based on the economic theory
that special interest groups frequently obtain government help
in extracting money from the general public as taxpayers or
consumers. The technical term for this ill-gotten gain is eco-
nomic rent. These special interest groups are relatively easy to
organize because they are small and their members have much
to gain. For corresponding reasons the public finds it difficult
to protect itself: members of the public have small, individual
stakes in any piece of legislation, and the large number of peo-
ple affected makes organization difficult. 146 As a result, accord-
ing to this economic theory, we can expect the rent seekers to
win. Most legislation, then, will really involve some rip-off of
the public, even if it purports to serve the public interest.14
7
Hence, courts should be deeply suspicious of regulatory
legislation.148
Although this approach leads to results similar to Lochner,
by society at large, as opposed to lawyers. Krier & Schwartz, Talking About
Taking (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 1295, 1307-10 (1978).
144. See Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition
of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 26-42.
145. I am indebted to my colleague Gerald Torres for this phrase, which he
used in a somewhat different context.
146. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 719.
147. See G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
(1975); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Per-
spective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-78 (1975). The fountainhead of this theory is
M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS (1965). More recently, Olson has argued that prolonged rent-
seeking ultimately saps stable societies of their economic vitality. See M.
OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-47 (1982).
148. See Epstein, supra note 124, at 713-15, 734. Another argument for
placing less trust in legislatures is that statutes may reflect only shifting coali-
tions and arbitrary agenda rules. See Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regu-
lation of Legislative Choice: Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to
Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373 (1988).
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it is not a natural rights approach. The Lochner Court consid-
ered maximum hours legislation a violation of the rights of the
bakers and their employers. The rent-seeking theory accuses
the legislation of raising the price of bread to the detriment of
consumers. Thus, the theory protects freedom of contract for
instrumental reasons, not because it views this freedom as an
especially important value in its own right.
The rent-seeking theory is vulnerable to three attacks.
First, it is based on a simplistic model of the political process.
We all know that special interest groups make a difference in
the legislative process, but the idea that they are generally deci-
sive is a caricature. A wide range of empirical studies by polit-
ical scientists and economists have confirmed that legislators'
views of the public interest do matter.1 49 One study of natural
gas legislation, for example, found that political ideology was an
excellent predictor of a legislator's vote.150 Probably the most
dramatic refutation of the rent-seeking model, however, is
found in recent legislation deregulating crucial industries. The
passage of such legislation is squarely contrary to the model's
predictions. 51 Moreover, arguments about the public interest,
often deriving from the work of influential economists, played
a crucial role in obtaining these reforms.152 Thus, in presuming
that statutes are normally the result of improper influence, the
rent-seeking model is too cynical about the legislative process.
Second, the rent-seeking model, if taken seriously, would re-
quire much broader judicial review than even the Lochner
Court contemplated. Regulatory legislation is far from being
the only potential form of rent-seeking. Recognizing this,
Epstein broadens his attack to include such matters as the pro-
gressive income tax, which he regards as a taking of private
property without just compensation. 53 Particular provisions of
the tax code would also presumably be vulnerable to charges of
149. For an extensive review of the literature, see Farber & Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 883-90, 893-901 (1987).
One of the best studies is Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Eco-
nomic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984).
150. See Mitchell, The Basis of Congressional Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L.
REv. 591, 598 (1979) (as measured by the rating given by the Americans for
Democratic Action).
151. See Kelman, Public Choice and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring
1987, at 80, 86.
152. Nelson, The Economics Profession and the Making of Public Policy, 25
J. ECON. LITERATURE 49, 60-64 (1987).
153. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 295-303; see also id. at 322-24 (tax and
transfer programs unconstitutional).
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rent-seeking.1' But this is only the beginning. The risk of
rent-seeking is also found in legislation involving tariffs, de-
fense contracts, public works projects, direct subsidies, and gov-
ernment loans. For control of rent-seeking to be effective, all
of these diverse governmental activities would have to be sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny. Leaving some areas such as tariffs or
the defense budget untouched would simply encourage special
interest groups to concentrate their efforts on those areas. If
rigorous judicial scrutiny were limited to regulatory programs,
the amount of rent-seeking in other governmental programs
would increase, largely cancelling out the reduction in rent-
seeking regulatory programs.
Third, limiting government to the pursuit of economic effi-
ciency unacceptably eliminates other legitimate public goals.
Major governmental programs, many of them with broad popu-
lar support and deep historical roots, are premised on a variety
of other goals, such as environmentalism, promotion of racial
equality, or redistribution of income.155
Thus, acceptance of the rent-seeking model would require
radical shifts in our social institutions by drastically altering ex-
isting expectations about governmental action. Doing this in
the name of an abstract economic theory is rather contrary to
154. See Doernberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreas-
ing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 953-59 (1987) (giving
examples).
155. As Frank Michelman explains:
To apply with any semblance of judicially principled rigor the eco-
nomics-inspired, market failure condition on the validity of legisla-
tion-the rule that legislation is invalid unless it can somehow be seen
as aimed at maximizing wealth by realizing potential gains from trade
that the market may be failing to realize-would, as Justice Linde ar-
gued, be to rule out, or at any rate call into serious question, a great
deal of legislation whose constitutionality many would not care to
think the least bit questionable whatever we may think of its merits.
Clouds of constitutional doubt would hang over legislation transfer-
ring wealth to the needy or to other favored groups such as veterans;
over legislation aimed at ends lacking true economic exchange value
such as preservation of endangered animal species, or of municipal
sanctuaries for family values; over legislation simply expressing "a
sense of the fitness of things" as by forbidding ungrateful lawsuits by
injured automobile guests, or inhumane treatment of animals, or con-
sanguineous intermarriages; over legislation groping towards the re-
definition of values in flux or ferment, a good example being laws
which, by forbidding discrimination against the interests of women, or
the handicapped, or racial minorities, inevitably seem to call for some
form and degree of special solicitude for those interests.
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Re-
view?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 508 (1979).
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the conservative vein in pragmatist thought.'1  More impor-
tantly, the dramatic expansion of judicial review to encompass
essentially all political issues entails a radical decrease in the
domain for democratic decision making. Legal pragmatism
does not view democracy as an absolute, but it does view de-
mocracy as a major value, not to be heedlessly sacrificed. In
short, a pragmatist judge could easily reject the rent-seeking
model.157
3. The Public Values Model
The public values model, the final version of heightened
judicial scrutiny, does not suffer from the defect of specifying
economic efficiency as the exclusive, legitimate goal of govern-
mental regulation. Rather, this model would allow the govern-
ment to implement a broader range of public values.
Nevertheless, this model, too, has its flaws.
To begin with, the notion of public values is far from self-
explanatory. For example, classic rent-seeking legislation is
often supported by reference to noneconomic values. Restric-
tions on advertising by lawyers, for example, were said to rest
on the values of professionalism. 15 Aid for farmers, which
some consider a classic example of a "raid on the Treasury,"1 59
is said to be justified by the inherent value of the family farm.
If judges accept all of these as public values, the public value
model will have little impact. On the other hand, if judges at-
tempt to give the model bite by narrowing the class of accept-
able public values, they will lack any generally acceptable
standards for making the distinction.160
The practical benefits of a public value approach are also
156. The theory itself, by giving special status to a single value, that of eco-
nomic efficiency, is also contrary to the moral vision of pragmatism.
157. To the extent that any good could be accomplished by invalidating
rent-seeking statutes, much of it could be accomplished with less dislocation in
legal doctrine by simply narrowing or eliminating the state action exemption
from the antitrust laws. That doctrine allows state regulation to impose
anticompetitive practices without violating federal antitrust laws. See Wiley, A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715-23 (1986).
Doing so would allow federal courts to invalidate anticompetitive state laws,
but would not require revolutionizing constitutional law.
158. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977) (discussing profes-
sionalism rationale).
159. See Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 207, 218 (1984) (stating that dairy price supports are "a fairly stark
payoff to a favored group").
160. This point is discussed more extensively in Farber & Frickey, supra
note 149, at 908-11.
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somewhat dubious. Special interest groups often have the
greatest effect, not on an overall legislative program, but on the
details of the statute.161 Judges have two choices, neither desir-
able, in applying the public value model to this situation. First,
they could strike down the entire statute on the theory that it
is tainted by the special interest provisions. This course is unat-
tractive if only because it eliminates legislation that by hypoth-
esis the court considers to have an overall legitimate purpose.
It would also allow groups to kill legislation by attaching spe-
cial interest riders, inviting courts to strike down the entire
statute.
Alternatively, the court could simply strike down the spe-
cial interest provisions. This is also problematic. The special
interest aspects of the legislation may not involve severable
provisions, but rather changes in the drafting of the basic statu-
tory scheme. If so, considerable judicial rewriting would be re-
quired. Moreover, this approach would make it more difficult
to pass genuine public value legislation.162 If we approve of tax
reform, civil rights legislation, deregulation, or any other major
legislative initiative, we cannot afford to tie the political hands
of the sponsors. An unprincipled exemption for a special inter-
est may be the necessary political price of a valuable reform.
A final disadvantage of the public value approach is that it
requires heightened judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of
such a broad range of legislation to insure that the purported
public value is indeed plausibly related to the legislation. Essen-
tially all legislation would be subjected to this reasonableness
test. This is a vast quantitative increase in the scope of judicial
review, inasmuch as serious judicial scrutiny is currently lim-
ited to discrete categories of statutes. 63 The Framers of the
Constitution rejected the idea of making federal judges part of
a Council of Revision with veto power over new legislation.
Making all legislation subject to judicial scrutiny for reason-
ableness seems uncomfortably close to a Council of Revision.
What is at stake here is more than an arcane historical detail.
It is quite basic to the institutional role of the Supreme Court
that its functioning should not duplicate the presidential veto
161. See K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 8, 163-64, 311, 392, 394-95 (1986).
162. Whereas a politically powerful special interest group can now be satis-
fied by granting it an exemption, this would become impossible if the exemp-
tions were judicially invalidated. Any adversely affected special interest group
would have only one choice: fight the entire legislation.
163. See Komesar, supra note 5, at 215.
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power. Giving the Supreme Court a general veto power curtails
democracy-as judicial review always does-but here the con-
flicting value of controlling special interests seems too pallid to
justify the sacrifice.
Thus, a revival of Lochner, whether in the guise of natural
law, Chicago School economics, or even political liberalism, is
an unappealing prospect. As natural law Lochner rests on a vi-
sion about the nature of property and economic freedom that
our society simply does not have. In its Chicago School form,
serious implementation would involve a revolutionary restruc-
turing of both our government and our economy. In its mildest
form, as represented by the public values model, it would still
significantly alter the institutional role of the judiciary and
probably achieve little.
4. A Lochner Obituary
Three closing comments about Lochner are in order. First,
the practical importance of Lochner should not be exaggerated.
The preceeding discussion was based on the premise that Loch-
ner would be rigorously applied. But the Court was never
really rigorous in following Lochner. Even in the Lochner era,
the Court upheld most regulatory legislation,164 and some that
it struck down may well have been ill-advised. 65 Many state
courts have continued to apply substantive due process restric-
tions to economic regulations.1 66 This has not apparently re-
164. See Currie, supra note 140, at 381-82.
165. Liberal lawyers seem to take it for granted that wage and hour re-
strictions are desirable. See L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTIUTIONAL LAw § 8-7,
at 453-55 (1978). Even politically liberal economists, however, seem to disa-
gree. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 369 (11th ed. 1980); Foster, Book Review,
4 CONST. COMMENTARY 443, 448 (1987). For a discussion of the economic litera-
ture, see Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 281, 319-21 (1984);
see also Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 742 (7th Cir.
1987) (separate opinion of Posner, J., joined by Easterbrook, J.) (according to a
survey, the single proposition "from which there is the least dissent among
American economists is that 'a ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and qual-
ity of housing available'" (quoting Frey, Pommerebne, Schneider & Gilbert,
Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 986, 991 (1984))).
166. See Note, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 1487, 1487-88 (1979). For recent examples, see Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. 892, 893 (1985) (White, J., dissenting
from summary affirmance) (citing state decisions striking down tort reform
laws); Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So.
2d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 1986) (striking down law forbidding insurance rebates);
Kentucky Milk Mktg. & Antimonopoly Comm'n v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893,
900 (Ky. 1985) (striking down prohibition on predatory milk pricing); Western
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sulted either in any grave harm to the democratic political
system of those states or in any noticeable gains to their econo-
mies. Thus if Lochner were resurrected, it probably would be
applied only fitfully.167
Second, rejection of Lochner does not necessarily mean
that the judiciary has no role in overseeing regulatory legisla-
tion. For example, the contract clause and takings clause may
require special scrutiny of retroactive legislation that impairs
settled expectations. The judiciary might also be able to play
some role in policing the process by which economic regulation
is enacted.168 What rejection of Lochner does entail is a rejec-
tion of any general judicial role in protecting economic
freedom.
Third, although the discussion so far has treated Lochner
as an open question, to be decided on its merits, the issue has
really long been settled. The constitutional jurisprudence of
the past fifty years has decisively rejected substantive protec-
tion of economic liberty of the kind found in Lochner.169
Whether Lochner was really a bad idea, as I have argued here,
is no longer a genuinely open question.170
Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 737 P.2d 478, 484 (Mont. 1987) (striking down
statutory requirement that owner of mineral rights obtain consent from owner
of surface rights to commence mining). Other courts have used equal protec-
tion analysis to reach similar results. See, e.g., Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d
1058, 1068 (Kan. 1987) (striking down limitation on damage recoveries in medi-
cal malpractice cases); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 328 (N.D.
1986) (striking down statute of limitations for product liability cases). For an
extensive discussion of judicial methodology in this area, see Auerbach, The
Anatomy of an Unusual Economic Substantive Due Process Case: Workers'
Compensation Insurers Rating Ass'n v. State, 68 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1984). To
the extent heightened scrutiny involves a greater scrutiny of means (rather
than sharp restrictions on permissible legislative ends), it is vulnerable to the
criticisms made in the next subsection.
167. It is of course no argument for Lochner that it would be too inconsis-
tently applied to do major harm.
168. For some suggestions along these lines, see Farber & Frickey, supra
note 149, at 911-24.
169. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 352-57
(3d ed. 1986).
170. One of the most thoughtful twentieth-century commentators on the
Supreme Court, Robert McCloskey, suggested that the Court probably should
not have gone so far in completely abdicating judicial review over economic
regulations. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 60-61. Nevertheless, he be-
lieved that even by 1962 the law was too well settled for the question to be
considered open:
All things considered, then, it seems best that the cause of eco-
nomic rights be left by the Supreme Court to lie in its uneasy grave.
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C. THE ABORTION ISSUE
The Supreme Court in Roe recognized the existence of a
constitutional right to an abortion under some circumstances.
My concern here is not with the Court's specification of when
abortions can be banned. Rather, the crucial issue is whether
the Court was justified in holding that the right to an abortion
is at least sometimes protected by the Constitution. The key
criticism of the Court's decision-the basis for comparing Roe
to Lochner-attacks the Court's recognition of this constitu-
tional right.171
My discussion of Roe proceeds in three phases. First, I dis-
cuss whether the Court properly recognized a right to an abor-
tion. I argue that the Court was correct in determining that a
fundamental right-the right to procreative autonomy-was in-
volved. What makes Roe a hard case is not this initial step in
the analysis, but rather the problem of assessing the reason-
ableness of the state's interest in forbidding abortions. Second, I
consider whether the arguments made against Lochner in the
preceeding section also militate against Roe. Finally, I consider
whether, if Roe was incorrectly decided, it should be overruled.
1. Abortion and Fundamental Rights
The Roe Court was somewhat vague about the nature of
the fundamental right implicated in Roe,172 but later decisions
indicate that the Court had in mind a fundamental right to con-
trol procreation.173 As discussed earlier, 74 the fundamental
... If the Supreme Court of today had a free hand in choosing the
subjects of judicial review, there might well be an argument for
choosing the right to work over some of the other subjects that en-
gage Court attention. But it does not have a free hand; its liberty of
choice has been considerably foreclosed by the episodic course of con-
stitutional law since 1937. The Supreme Court, like the American
political system of which it is a part, proceeds by impulse rather than
by design, pragmatically rather than foresightedly. Like the United
States, the Court derives advantages from this approach; but like the
United States, the Court, too, is bound by its limitations.
Id. at 62.
171. For a useful summary of the Roe debate, see G. GUNTHER, supra note
2, at 525-35. To the extent that the attack on Roe is based on a general rejec-
tion of the fundamental rights doctrine, it is answered in Section IIA supra.
172. See 410 U.S. at 152-53 (referring to "right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy" having "some extension" to
matters such as procreation and family). The privacy rubric does not seem
particularly helpful in analyzing this issue, because the concept of privacy in-
cludes a diverse collection of individual interests.
173. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (discussing "funda-
mental right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child"); Carey v. Pop-
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rights doctrine is deeply entrenched in our constitutional tradi-
tion. The first issue in evaluating Roe is whether the Court was
correct in viewing control of procreation as a fundamental
right.
Despite the vehemence of the attacks on Roe,175 it seems
clear that the Court was correct in classifying procreative rights
as fundamental. Although these rights were not discussed spe-
cifically in connection with the fourteenth amendment,176 his-
torians suggest that Republicans, who drafted and enacted the
amendment, considered rights relating to the family fundamen-
tal.177 American society has traditionally drawn a distinction
between public matters involving government and the market-
place and private matters involving the family.178 As Professor
Cox, who believes that Roe was wrongly decided, concedes, "it
is hard to think of a more fundamental invasion of personal lib-
erty than to tell a woman that she must or may not bear a
child."17 9
As the Roe Court pointed out, a line of Supreme Court de-
cisions going back many years had granted parenthood and pro-
creation a fundamental constitutional status. °8 0 That the Court
ulation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977) (reading Roe as involving "right
of decision in matters of childbearing"); see also Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 775-82 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (discussing woman's interest in making decision on childbearing).
For an extensive discussion of the fundamental rights doctrine as it bears on
Roe, see Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1161-87, 1303-06 (1980).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 98-122.
175. The standard arguments against Roe can be found in Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein,
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup.
CT. REv. 159 (1973); Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case
Law, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (1979); see also supra note 171.
176. Although the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not refer to procrea-
tive rights, it is not difficult to imagine what their reaction would have been if
George M had had the temerity to tell the colonists how many children they
could have.
177. See Farber & Muench, supra note 106, at 276 n.158.
178. See, e.g., Olsen, The Family and the Market" A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1501-02 (1983).
179. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CoNsTrrurON 329 (1987); see also id at
334 (concluding that Roe was wrong). Even Judge Bork concedes that marital
privacy of the kind involved in Griswold, the contraception case, is "essential
to a civilized society." The Grilling of Judge Bork, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1987,
at 27, 29.
180. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. Among the cases cited in Roe were Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down ban on interracial marriages,
partly on ground that marriage is fundamental right); and Skinner v.
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was not simply imaginatively rewriting precedent is indicated
by the number of lower court judges who had correctly antici-
pated Roe on the basis of similar reasoning. 8 1 Popular consen-
sus also supported the Roe Court's recognition of the right to an
abortion, with a large majority of the public favoring legaliza-
tion of abortion under at least some circumstances. 8 2
Moreover, the Court's decision to exercise judicial review
in Roe was also supported by the presence of defects relating to
the political process. 8 3 Procreative autonomy is important to
both genders, but women bear the physical burden and, in our
society, most of the social burden of raising children.-84 Many
abortion statutes were passed before women could even vote,185
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a mandatory sterilization
law). The most notable of the earlier cases was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Court declared unconstitutional a ban on the use
of contraceptives "for the purpose of preventing conception," even by married
couples. Id. at 480, 485-86. As some leading constitutional commentators have
stated, the Roe Court's recognition of a fundamental right "developed without
great difficulty" out of earlier cases such as Griswold. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 169, at 694; accord, Heymann & Barzelay, supra note
14, at 769-75.
181. The lower court cases are discussed in E. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS,
AND THE COURTS: Roe v. Wade AND rrs AFTERMATH 43-59 (1987); Comment, A
Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradic-
tions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177, 184-91. The extent of popular
consensus can be seen from the fact that the California bill liberalizing abor-
tion was signed by no other than Ronald Reagan. See E. RUBIN, supra, at 23.
182. See Callahan, How Technology is Reframing the Abortion Debate, 16
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1986, at 33, 38; Sussman, Attitudes on Legalized
Abortion Have Changed with the Times, The Washington Post Nat'l Weekly
Ed., Jan. 13, 1986, at 37. For example, in 1972 over 70% favored an abortion "if
there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby," and over 80% "if the
woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy." There was
also a striking trend toward legislative liberalization in this period. See Com-
ment, supra note 181, at 179-83.
183. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 199-200 (linking Roe with gender
equality),
184. See Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1036-37 (1976). John
Ely suggests that fetuses are even less politically powerful than women, Ely,
supra note 175, at 933-35, but this seems irrelevant without a previous determi-
nation that fetuses are entitled to have their interests represented in the polit-
ical process--or in other words, that they are themselves "persons" protected
by the fourteenth amendment. The Roe Court had little difficulty rejecting
the personhood argument, see 410 U.S. at 157-59, and that aspect of the opinion
has not been controversial with scholars. If fetuses are not protected by the
fourteenth amendment, their exclusion from the political process is irrelevant
in determining the level of scrutiny. Neither animals nor foreign nationals
abroad are represented in the American political process, but this is no reason
for strict scrutiny of governmental actions affecting them since they are not
entitled to constitutional protection.
185. For example, the Texas statute involved in Roe was passed before the
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and women are still underrepresented in legislatures. 8 6 More-
over, much of the opposition to abortion stems from highly or-
ganized, intense pressure based on sectarian religious
beliefs' 8 7-- a form of political activity about which the Framers
were rightly concerned. In terms of current case law, then, Roe
is buttressed by the cases invoking heightened scrutiny in laws
involving gender discrimination, 8 8 as well as cases expressing
concern about political entanglement by religious groups. 8 9
Admittedly, Roe does not fit squarely into either line of cases.
Combined, however, with the clear American consensus about
the fundamental nature of procreative rights, these cases give
powerful support to the argument for serious judicial scrutiny
of abortion laws.
Given the presence of a fundamental right, the Court was
Civil War. See E. RUBIN, supra note 181, at 57. See generally J. ELY, supra
note 3, at 164-69 (arguing that past political exclusion of women justifies
heightened judicial scrutiny).
186. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (women "vastly" underrepresented among government officeholders).
Apparently, one of the major problems female candidates face is greater diffi-
culty in fundraising. See Women Candidates Need Special Help, Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Oct. 30, 1985, at 15A.
It is important, however, not to overplay the gender theory. One of the
themes of Luker's book is that the abortion battle is largely a battle among
women. See K. LUKER, supra note 13, at 192-215. Indeed, some studies suggest
that women as a group may be more strongly opposed to abortion than men.
See H. RODMAN, B. SARviS & J. BONAR, THE ABORTION QUESTION 141-44
(1987); Uslaner & Weber, Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Policies in
the Nation and the States: Changes and Stability After the Roe and Doe Deci-
sions, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1772, 1779 (1979). For this and other reasons, the gen-
der discrimination theory does not seem strong enough by itself to support
Roe.
Despite the substantial female support of the prolife movement, the gen-
der theory should not be entirely discarded. Many women who are against
abortion in the abstract change their mind when confronted with an lnwanted
pregnancy. See H. RODMAN, B. SARvis & J. BONAR, supra, at 38. Also, because
career women strongly favor the prochoice position, that position would be po-
litically more powerful if women were more equally represented in the mem-
bership of legislatures. Hence, the limited political role of women, even today,
probably does facilitate the passage of anti-abortion legislation. Moreover,
other forms of gender discrimination may be responsible, in subtle ways, for
some women's opposition to abortion.
187. See K. LUKER, supra note 13, at 196-97, 223-24.
188. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The prolife activists are often moti-
vated by the very stereotypes about women's roles that the Court condemned
in these cases. See K. LUKER, supra note 13, at 205-15.
189. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 165, § 15-10, at
928-30.
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obligated to assess independently the state's justification for in-
fringing the right. What makes Roe so difficult is the strength
of the countervailing interest asserted by the state: the interest
in preserving human life. Few issues in contemporary law or
politics are more controversial or deeply emotional than the va-
lidity of this justification. Roe is a hard case in more ways than
one. Nevertheless, my tentative view is that the Court was cor-
rect in holding a total ban on abortion unconstitutional.
In particular, I doubt that the interest in preserving human
life is sufficiently implicated to justify banning all abortions
before the eighth week of pregnancy-a category that includes
over one-half of all abortions.190 Before the twelfth week,' 9 '
the fetus does not engage in organized movement. At twelve
weeks, its brain weighs only about ten grams, and the cerebral
cortex (the main distinction between humans and animals) is
primitive and almost nonexistent. 92 Brain wave studies also
suggest that consciousness cannot begin any earlier than the
twelfth week and probably only later.193 These facts make it
difficult to say that the fetus has already become in any real
sense a living person.194 The possibility that it will later be-
come a person gives the fetus moral value,195 but this possibility
is itself conditioned on the woman's willingness to continue the
pregnancy, the very question at issue.196 Against this value
190. See Callahan, supra note 182, at 36. He adds that over 90% of abor-
tions are performed before the twelfth week of pregnancy. Id.
191. My argument would probably support a right to abortion through the
first trimester, so the restriction to eight weeks is simply a matter of caution
to provide a margin of error. For present purposes the important question is
not the precise extent of the protected right but its existence.
192. See Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to
Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1208 (1982).
193. See id. at 1207-10.
194. This point is not necessarily decisive, for the state can have a strong
interest in protecting things other than persons. See Ely, supra note 175, at
926. Also, note that it is not inconsistent to say that the fetus is morally not
yet a person while conceding that it is biologically alive and a member of our
species. See Wreen, Abortion: The Extreme Liberal Position, 12 J. MED. &
PHIL. 241, 242 (1987).
195. The argument against banning abortion is even stronger at the very
beginning of pregnancy, when the embryo has no nervous system at all, and in
fact may not even be fully individuated: until the end of the second week,
twinning is still possible. See H. RODMAN, B. SARvIs & J. BoNAR, supra note
186, at 34; Callahan, supra note 182, at 34-36; King, The Juridical Status of the
Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1647,
1673-74 (1979).
196. Even if the fetus is a person, the woman may not be morally obligated
to continue the pregnancy under all circumstances. See J. THOMSON, RIGHTs,
REsTrrUIoN AND RIsK 11-12, 18-19 (1986).
1370 [Vol. 72:1331
LEGAL PRAGMATISM
must be weighed the powerful reasons 197 that may impel a wo-
man to choose an abortion.198 On balance, preservation of the
fetus, at a point in pregnancy when consciousness could not yet
exist, is too weak a justification to eliminate the woman's fun-
damental interest in deciding whether to bear a child.199
If only my personal assessment were involved, I would be
troubled about making it the basis for a constitutional holding
on such a difficult question. In reality, however, this assess-
ment is not merely personal. It is in fact a widespread societal
consensus. 200 Over eighty percent of the American people be-
lieve that abortion is permissible to preserve the mother's
health or to prevent the birth of a deformed child.201 There is
an equally widespread belief that a woman pregnant as the re-
sult of rape is entitled to an abortion.20 2 None of these circum-
stances would be considered sufficient justification for murder,
so the implicit assumption must be that less is at stake. This so-
cietal consensus, which is by no means a break from earlier
197. Although it is a prolife cliche that women have abortions for reasons
of casual convenience, this does not seem to be true: women take the abortion
decision very seriously. See K. LUKER, supra note 13, at 203, 285 n.3.
198. As John Ely conceded in his scathing critique of the Roe opinion, "Let
us not underestimate what is at stake: Having an unwanted child can go a
long way toward ruining a woman's life." Ely, supra note 175, at 923.
199. See Kushner, Having a Life versus Being Alive, J. MED. ETHics 1, 5-8
(1984). The idea that a person's life does not begin with conception in no way
conflicts with common sense. It seems decidedly odd, for example, to answer a
question about whether a person has ever been in New York City, with the
answer "Yes, she visited there several months before she was born." This
seems peculiar in precisely the same way as answering the question, "Did Lin-
coln ever return to Springfield?" with "Yes, after he was dead."
200. See Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689, 733-34
(1976). I also take comfort from the fact that my view is shared by such mod-
erate, thoughtful judges as Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
201. See supra note 182. By 1979 some 70% of all lawyers believed that
"abortion decisions should be left to the woman." Nowak, Professor Rodel4
The Burger Cour and Public Opinion, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 107, 126 (1984).
Notably, 77% of Catholics interviewed recently believed that abortion should
be legal if there is a "strong chance of serious defect in the baby." Sussman,
supra note 182, at 37. The Court's rulings should not, of course, be dictated by
public opinion polls, but when a previous decision enjoys widespread public
support, overruling it in the name of majoritarianism seems pedantic. Admit-
tedly, popular opinion does not necessarily correspond with the precise test
adopted in Roe, but it does support the Roe Court's decision that women have a
right to an abortion under at least some circumstances.
202. See Sussman, supra note 182, at 37. More detailed information about
public opinion regarding abortion can be found in K. LUKER, supra note 13, at
216-17, 224-27, 287 n.18; H. RoDMAN, B. SARvis & J. BONAR, supra note 186, at
135-56; Uslaner & Weber, supra note 186.
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American traditions, 20 3 is inconsistent with a belief that preser-
vation of the fetus automatically outweighs the woman's vital
interests.204
Thus, in seeking to impose a complete ban on abortion, the
state is invading a fundamental right based on a justification
that the great majority of Americans, for good reason, do not
accept.20 5 Given this social consensus, a court would be well
justified in rejecting the "right to life" justification and hence
holding that a complete ban on abortion is unconstitutional.20 6
Some readers, no doubt, disagree with my assessment of
the strength of the state interest. This should not, however, be
surprising, nor should it count against legal pragmatism as a
method. Legal pragmatism does not claim to make hard cases
easy, or to transform bitter disputes into tranquil consensus.
Legal pragmatism does, however, attempt to do two things.
First, it attempts to bring to light the real crux of disputes.
Here, the real issue is the fetus's status, rather than a jurispru-
dential argument about judicial review. Roe would be an
equally hard case even if the Constitution explicitly protected
the right to privacy. Second, legal pragmatism attempts to re-
solve disputes by finding arguments that can command the
greatest possible consensus. On the abortion issue, we cannot
203. As Professor Luker observes, Roe is "much more in line with the
traditional treatment of abortion than most Americans appreciate"; the view
that abortion is murder is a "relatively recent belief in American history." K.
LUKER, supra note 13, at 11, 14. Abortions were actually very widespread, and
frequently performed by doctors, even when they were purportedly illegal.
See id. at 36-37, 45-47, 49-51, 81. Prosecutions were few, and penalties were
light. Id. at 53-54.
204. Prolife activists do not accept any of these justifications for abortion.
See K. LUKER, supra note 13, at 230.
205. The passage of anti-abortion statutes by many legislatures does not
militate against this conclusion. Before Roe the legislative process was flawed
in the ways discussed earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89.
Since Roe, prochoice groups have been able to rely on the courts rather than
being forced to organize and protect themselves in the legislature.
206. The existence of a societal consensus is neither a necessary nor a suffi-
cient basis for judicial intervention. Rather, recourse to the conventional social
understanding is one possible ingredient in a judge's analysis, which in some
contexts may provide useful guidance. In the analysis in the text, for example,
consensus and tradition function fairly noncontroversially in establishing a
right to procreative freedom and also serve to bolster the analysis of the state's
interest, but other factual and normative premises play a crucial role in the
argument. For an insightful discussion of related jurisprudential problems, see
Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339
(1987) (see especially pages 395-97).
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expect even the best possible arguments to produce unanimity.
At most, we can hope to persuade the "undecideds."
2. Roe Versus Lochner
In arguing against a revival of Lochner, I suggested that
taking Lochner seriously would massively disrupt existing insti-
tutions and expectations.20 7 Roe is different. Because it is lim-
ited to a relatively narrow constitutional right-procreative
freedom-it neither requires a widespread restructuring of ex-
isting governmental operations nor places the Court in the posi-
tion of routinely determining the reasonableness of all
legislation. The right to freedom of contract and relating inter-
ests in economic autonomy is simply much broader than the fo-
cused right upheld in Roe.
Still, even if Roe itself is seen as upholding only a narrow
fundamental right, a critic of Roe might respond, a similar rea-
soning process might be used to establish a whole panoply of
new constitutional rights. The Roe holding may be much more
limited than Lochner, but the Roe methodology may be just as
dangerous in the long run.20 8 To the extent that this argument
is aimed at the general notion of fundamental rights, it has al-
ready been rebutted, but it can also be taken as a more specific
attack on the Roe opinion. Because the Roe Court was fairly
offhand in its explanation of why abortion is a fundamental
right, a similarly offhand argument might suffice to create ad-
ditional fundamental rights.
This argument, though not unreasonable, has proved un-
founded. The Court has not enthusiastically created new fun-
damental rights on the basis of the Roe model. Instead, it has
been resistant to arguments in favor of expanding Roe.20 9 Fur-
thermore, the argument for Roe rests on an unusual combina-
tion of factors: a strong consensus in favor of the importance of
procreative rights, supported by a line of existing Supreme
Court precedent; significant flaws in the political process be-
cause of the involvement of gender issues and religious entan-
glement; an objective basis for doubting the reasonableness of
the state's justification; and an overwhelming social consensus
207. See supra text accompanying notes 141-45 & 153-57.
208. In this view the real threat is not Roe itself but "meta-Roe."
209. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843-44 (1986); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977). I do not mean to endorse the Bowers opinion.
That case raises issues different from but perhaps as difficult as Roe itself. See
Kaufman, supra note 3, at 198-99.
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against the logic of the state's position. It seems unlikely that
an equally strong case can be made in favor of many other ar-
guably fundamental rights.
In part the strength of the reaction against Roe among con-
stitutional scholars is attributable to the opinion itself. In de-
claring the presence of a fundamental right, the Court was too
cursory, as if it found implying such rights an easy matter re-
quiring little justification.210 In its balancing the Court may
well have been too categorical and too dismissive of the state's
regulatory interests.21 1 These features of the Roe opinion are
unhappily reminiscent of the Lochner style. Nevertheless, the
basic holding of the case seems sound and is not vulnerable to
these criticisms. 212
3. Should Roe Be Overruled?
As I suggested earlier, for a pragmatist the Lochner ques-
tion is no longer an open one. The Roe question is not so well
settled, but a pragmatist must also take into account the fact
that Roe has been decided. For the purposes of this section, I
will assume that Roe was wrong. If so, should it be
overruled?2 13
For three reasons I believe that even if Roe was wrong it
should not be overruled. First, Roe does not satisfy the normal
tests21 4 the Court uses to justify overruling. If it was wrong, it
was not egregiously wrong. It has not been undermined by
later precedent, and the Court has not found its test unwork-
able.215 And apart from direct reliance on the Roe opinion by
doctors and by millions of women, it has also reshaped the
political landscape in ways that would be difficult to undo.216
210. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
211. As I have stressed throughout, my concern in this Article is not with
the details of the Court's holding, but with the basic decision to give at least
some abortions constitutional protection.
212. Roe simply is not Lochner, but like generals, constitutional scholars
seem always to be condemned to fight the last war over again.
213. As before, I will address only the basic holding that abortions are con-
stitutionally protected, rather than the details of the Court's balancing.
214. For an insightful discussion of these standards, see Frickey, Stare De-
cisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2
CONST. COMmENTARY 123 (1985).
215. For discussion of the post-Roe decisions, see J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YouNG, supra note 169, at 696-700.
216. The right-to-life movement itself essentially owes its existence to Roe;
legislative liberalization of abortion did not spark the same violent opposition,
see K. LUKER, supra note 13, at 126-37. Also, I suspect that the long-run effect
of Roe has been to leave the women's movement weaker than it otherwise
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Thus, the normal standards for applying stare decisis militate
against overruling Roe.
Second, overruling Roe would not in reality restore signifi-
cant power to the state legislatures. For practical reasons,
those legislatures would find themselves largely powerless to
halt abortions. Even when abortions were illegal, the laws
were virtually unenforceable; indeed, studies suggest that al-
most as many illegal abortions occurred before Roe as legal
abortions immediately after Roe. Today, increased public ap-
proval of abortions, support for the right of abortion by gyne-
cologists (many of whom are now women), and the virtual
certainty that many states would choose not to illegalize abor-
tion, would all make state bans on abortions ineffective.2 1 7 To
the extent these laws had any effect, their impact would be on
the most vulnerable groups of women: the poor, adolescents,
racial minorities, and the handicapped. Moreover, strict abor-
tion bans do not have majority support, given the overwhelm-
ing public view that at least some abortions are justified.2 1 8
Thus, as a practical matter, overruling Roe would not be a
meaningful blow for majority rule.2 1 9
Third, overruling Roe at this point would be more than a
correction of an erroneous opinion. It would be seen by the
public as a major defeat for the Court as a guardian, even if
sometimes an overzealous guardian, of individual rights. The
Bork confirmation hearings made it clear just how seriously
Congress and the public take the Court's role, and indeed how
well accepted the concept of fundamental rights has become.220
would have been, by depriving the movement of what would otherwise have
been a powerful political issue. Prochoice groups are clearly weaker as a re-
sult of the complacency induced by Roe. See id. at 241.
217. For an extensive explanation of these and other reasons why overrul-
ing Roe would have a minimal effect on the number of abortions performed,
see Kaplan, Abortion as a Vice Crime-A "What If' Story (forthcoming in
LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs.). See also Collins, Is There "Life" (or "Choice") Af-
ter Roe?, 3 CONST. COMmENTARY 91 (1986).
218. See supra notes 182, 201.
219. The same factors suggest that overruling Roe would not be in accord-
ance with "the prevailing sense of justice today," as Justice Stevens put it in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
220. The fundamental rights issue may well have been Bork's downfall. As
one commentator explained:
The issue that jelled for the opposition, surprisingly, was privacy. The
number of senators who gave prominence to the privacy issue in their
speeches opposing Judge Bork was striking.
Indeed, the privacy issue underwent a fascinating transformation
during the course of this confirmation debate.
Before the confirmation hearings began, the word "privacy" in
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For the Court to abandon one of its most important decisions
upholding individual rights, while under intense political fire
and soon after major personnel changes, would be too much of
an abdication of its independence and institutional role.221
No doubt there is room for a fine-tuning of Roe. The pre-
cise balance cast by the Court is subject to reassessment based
on further thought and new information. It would be a mis-
take, however, for the Court to repudiate the basic principle of
Roe.222 And any fine-tuning should be cautious, for even if the
Court could have reasonably struck a different balance in Roe,
stare decisis places a considerable burden on those who seek to
restrike the balance.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by criticizing grand theory as an ap-
proach to constitutional law. The strongest argument against
grand theory is based on experience: many extremely able
people have attempted to discover the true foundation of con-
political discourse was widely understood as a metaphor for abortion,
a politically dangerous topic.
During the hearings, privacy became another metaphor entirely.
It came to stand for the whole theme of fundamental rights, the con-
cept of an expansive Constitution in contrast to Judge Borl's view
that the Constitution was limited by its precise language and the in-
tent of its 18th Century framers.
The abortion question itself became subsumed into the broader
question of a generalized right to privacy, a concept that politicians
were suddenly rushing to embrace.
Greenhouse, What Went Wrong, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at B10, col. 1, cols.
3-5 (city ed.); see also Kurland, Bork- The Transformation of a Conservative
Constitutionalist, 9 CARnozo L. REV. 127, 132-34 (1987) (criticizing Bork on
this basis); Rosenthal, Victory for Conservatism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at
27, cols. 5, 6 ("The Griswold case ... was for some [Senators] the touchstone.").
221. Notably, only 17% of judges interviewed in a recent poll thought Roe
should be overruled; an equal number thought it was wrongly decided but
should be upheld because of stare decisis; and 44% thought it was rightly de-
cided. The rest were undecided. The View from the Bench, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 10,
1987, at S-12.
222. The discussion in Part IIC may be a bit jarring to some readers. The
Supreme Court does not, for example, customarily cite public opinion polls in
its decisions. This raises the interesting question of "transparency": to what
extent is the judge obligated to write an opinion fully explaining the true rea-
sons? To the extent pragmatism involves an expansion in the range of analy-
sis now incorporated in conventional judicial rhetoric, this is a particular
problem for the pragmatist judge. A full analysis of this problem would be too
complex to attempt here, but two preliminary remarks are in order. First,
transparency is a great virtue, but not necessarily an absolute. Second, prag-
matist rhetoric is probably less jarring in dealing with remedial matters or
matters of judicial process like stare decisis-as in this Subsection.
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stitutional law, and none has succeeded. There are also reasons
for doubting that a foundational approach to constitutional law
is desirable. The alternative is a less structured mode of deci-
sion making called legal pragmatism. Legal pragmatism tries
to analyze problems based on both social policy and traditional
legal doctrines, seeking a satisfactory adjustment of the two.
Although some might argue that legal pragmatism is inherently
ad hoc, I have argued that principled pragmatism is far from
being an oxymoron.223
The pragmatist attempt to combine respect for precedent
and judicial creativity is as much a way of thought as a set of
doctrines. Hence, legal pragmatism is easier to exhibit than to
summarize. But if there is any one passage that summarizes
the essence of legal pragmatism, it comes from the opening par-
agraph of one of the most famous books in American legal his-
tory, Holmes's The Common Law:
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a
particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries,
and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and cor-
ollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we
must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must
alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But
the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the
two into new products at every stage.224
This blend of principle and policy, of tradition and innovation,
is the essence of legal pragmatism. It holds the key to a fruitful
understanding of constitutional law.
The second half of the Article attempted to justify these
claims on behalf of legal pragmatism by demonstrating its ap-
plication to a central problem in modern constitutional law:
whether (and if so, when) the Supreme Court should give con-
stitutional status to rights not named in the constitutional text.
223. As a perceptive recent article points out,
The ideologue seeks an iron logic. Who says A, he thunders, must
say B. But that is not the only way to act in accord with principle.
There is a difference between the coherence of ideas, so dear to phi-
losophers, and the coherence of our lives or the coherence of practical
judgment.
Selznick, supra note 17, at 463.
224. 0. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 1.
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This practice of protecting unwritten fundamental rights, I
have argued, is strongly rooted in our legal and social tradi-
tions. Although it carries risks, and therefore should only be
done cautiously, recognition of unwritten fundamental rights
has been a valuable part of our constitutional process.
The more difficult question is what rights the Court should
recognize. Earlier in this century, the Court gave constitutional
status to a general right of economic liberty. Arguments have
been made recently in various guises for a return to vigorous
Supreme Court oversight of economic legislation. Such over-
sight, however, would involve too pervasive a judicial role in
overseeing most government operations, as well as potentially
too radical a restructuring of society.
Roe v. Wade225 is the ultimate test for fundamental rights
analysis. The discussion in this Article is limited to the core
holding of Roe that the state must allow abortion under at least
some circumstances. I have argued that the right of procreative
freedom involved in Roe is clearly fundamental, but that the
sufficiency of the state's interest in banning abortions is a
closer question. On balance, however, particularly given the
strong public consensus that at least some abortions are permis-
sible, I believe that a complete ban on abortions cannot be justi-
fied. Even if this conclusion is wrong, little would be gained
and much damage would be done to the Court by overruling
Roe.
Legal pragmatism does not, as the analyses of Lochner and
Roe indicate, lend itself to simple answers to hard constitu-
tional questions. The pragmatist's answers may be less elegant,
but in the end I believe they are more satisfying than those
that any grand theory could provide.
225. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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